The Macroeconomics of Presidential Popularity. by Washburn, Susan Katherine
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1989
The Macroeconomics of Presidential Popularity.
Susan Katherine Washburn
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Washburn, Susan Katherine, "The Macroeconomics of Presidential Popularity." (1989). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 4819.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/4819
INFORMATION TO USERS
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the text directly from the original or 
copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies 
are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type 
of computer printer.
The quality of th is reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, 
colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, 
print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these 
will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright m aterial 
had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also 
photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. These are also available as 
one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and w hite photographic p rin t for an additional 
charge.
Photographs included in the original m anuscript have 
been reproduced xerographically in this copy. H igher 
quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are 
available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microlilms International 
A Belt & Howell Information C om pany  
3 0 0  North Z eeb  Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346  USA 
313 /761-4700  8 0 0 /5 21 -0600
Order Number 9017308
The m acroeconom ics o f presidential popularity
Washburn, Susan Katherine, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1989
Copyright © 1990  by W ashburn, Susan K atherine. A ll rights reserved.
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
THE MACROECONOMICS OF PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
i n
The D e p a r t m e n t  of E c on om ics
by
Susan Katherine Washburn 
B.A., B.S., Blue Mountain College, 198A 
M.S., Louisiana State University, 19B6 
August 19S9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Though my name appears as the author of this volume, 
this dissertation a joint effort. I express deep
appreciation to my advisor* David Smyth* for his guidance, 
direction, and sound advice. Numerous other faculty members 
have provided helpful comments. I extend a special "thank 
you" to Lamar Jones and Carter Hill for their reassurances 
which have kept me to the task.
Several others are deserving of special mention. My 
dear friends Cynthia Sherman, Elizabeth Brown, and Greg 
Taylor have provided tremendous daily support while 
:searching and writing the dissertation. It has been
gratifying to have "fellow strugglers" also making their way 
through this process. To Melissa Waters and Prosper Raynold 
I say, "At long last, we’ve made it."
Finally, I express appreciation to my sister, Laurie 
Baldwin, and most especially to my parents, Bill and Sarah 
Washburn. Through the good and the bad they have been a 
faithful source of financial, emotional, and spiritual 
stability. This completed work is a tribute to them.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES v
LIST OF FIGURES viii
ABSTRACT ix
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 1
An Overview
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Concave Social 
Indifference Map
Empirical Estimation of the Presidential Popularity 
Function and the Social Preference Function
Summary
2. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY 3B 
FUNCTION
The Data
The Initial Model 
Tests for Structural Change 
Sets of Equations Model 
Summary
3. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES 79
Introduction
The Eisenhower Administration 
The Kennedy-Johnson Administration 
The Nixon-Ford Administration 
The Carter Administration 
The Reagan Administration
A Comparison of Republican Administrations 
Summary
iii
4. SOCIAL PREFERENCES, THE PHILLIPS CURVE, AND 1E5 
THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE
Introduction
The Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
Popularity Maximization for the Reagan 
Administration
Popularity Maximization for the Nixon-Ford 
Administration
Popularity Maximization for the Eisenhower 
Administration
Summary
5. A DISAGGREGATED MODEL OF POPULARITY 156
Introduction
The Data and the Model
The Empirical Technique
The Choice of an Unemployment Rate
Disaggregation by Race
Disaggregaton by Sex
Disaggregation by Political Party
Disaggregaton by Geographical Region
Summary
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 204
REFERENCE LIST 211
Append i x
1. Summary of Empirical Work on the Estimation 216




E.l Maximum and Minimum Values for the
Presidencies..................................... 67
2.2 Presidential Popularity Function Estimates*
March 1953-November 1988........................ 68
E.3 Dummy Variable Model, Kennedy-Johnson and
Nixon-Ford Estimated Jointly...................  69
2.A Sets of Equations Model, All Administrations
Estimated Separately............................  70
E.5 F-tests for Structural Change  ................ 71
2.6 Sets of Equations Model, Kennedy-Johnson and
Nixon-Ford Estimated Jointly...................  72
2.7 F-tests for Structural Change ..................  73
3.1 Estimates for the Eisenhower Administration . . 105
3.2 dP/dU for Alternate Combinations of P and U,
Eisenhower Administration ...................... 106
3.3 Estimates for the Kennedy-Johnson Administration 107
3.A Estimates for the Kennedy-Johnson Administration,
Alternative Specifications of "Honey" and 
"Killed".............  108
3.5 Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration,
Alternate Watergate Specifications................109
3.6 Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration,
Alternate Specifications of "Honey" ........... 110
3.7 dP/dU for Alternate Combinations of P and U
Nixon-Ford Administration 111
3.B Estimates for the Carter Administration . . . .  112
3.9 Estimates for the Carter Administration,
Alternate Specifications of "Honey" ........... 113
3.10 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
Alternate Specifications of "Honey" ........... 11A
3.11 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
Alternate Specifications of "Iran"................115
v
3.12 dP/dU for Alternate Combinations of P and U?
Reagan Administration ..........................  116
3.13 Eisenhower and Nixon-Ford Estimation. . . . . .  117
3.14 Nixon-Ford and Reagan Estimation...................118
4.1 Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve
Estimates? 1977-198B? Reagan Administration . . 147
4.2 Presidential Popularity with Alternative Rates
of Expected Inflation? Reagan Administration. . 148
4.3 Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve
Estimates? 1967-1977? Nixon-Ford Administration 149
4.4 Presidential Popularity with Alternative Rates 
of Expected Inflation? Nixon-Ford
Administration? Zero Energy Inflation ......... 150
4.5 Presidential Popularity with Alternative Rates 
of Expected Inflation? Nixon-Ford
Administration? 3*/. and 13‘/. Energy Inflation . . 151
4.6 Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve
Estimates? 1954-1969? Eisenhower Administration 152
4.7 Presidential Popularity with Alternative Rates
of Expected Inflation? Eisenhower Administration 153
5.1 Test of Appropriate Unemployment Rate by Races 186
5.2 Test of Appropriate Unemployment Rate by Sexes 187
5.3 Test of Appropriate Unemployment Rate by Region 188
5.4 Disaggregation by Race for the Reagan
Administration......................................189
5.5 Chi-Square Tests of Minority and White
Responses  .................   190
5.6 Disaggregation by Race for the Nixon-Ford
Administration......................................191
5.7 Disaggregation by Sex for the Reagan
Administration......................................192
5.8 Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Men and
Women 193
5.9 Disaggregation by Sex for the Nixon-Ford
Administration......................................194
vi
5.10 Disaggregation by Partisan Party for the
Reagan Administration ..........................  195
5.11 Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Partisan 
Parties, Reagan Administration.................... 196
5.12 Disaggregation by Partisan Party, Carter 
Administration.  ................................. 197
5.13 Disaggregation by Partisan Party, Nixon-Ford 
Administration..................................... 198
5.1^ Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Partisan
Parties, Nixon-Ford Administration................199
5.15 Disaggregation by Region for the Reagan 
Administration..................................... 200
5.16 Chi-Square Values by Region, Reagan 
Administration..................................... 201
5.17 Disaggregation by Region for the Nixon-Ford 
Administration..................................... 202
5.18 Chi-Square Values by Region, Nixon-Ford 
Administration..................................... 202
vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
F i Dure Page
1.1 Social Preference Curves......................... 37
2.1 Eisenhower Popularity ........................... 74
2.2 Kennedy-Johnson Popularity......................  75
2.3 Nixon-Ford Popularity ........................... 76
2.4 Carter Popularity . . . . .  .............  77
2.5 Reagan Popularity .    7B
3.1 Social Preference Curves for Eisenhower . . . .  119
3.2 Social Preference Curves for Nixon-Ford . . . .  120
3.3 Social Preference Curves for Reagan ............ 121
3.4 Social Preference Curves for Republican
Regimes* 50V Popularity ........................  122
3.5 Social Preference Curves for Republican
Regimes, 55V* Popularity...........................123
3.6 Social Preference Curves for Republican
Regimes, 62*/* Popularity...........................124
4.1 Social Preference Functions and Phillips Curves 154
4.2 Popularity Maximization for Reagan................ 155
viii
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines several issues dealing with the 
public’s social preference function between inflation and 
unemployment. First* the preference function is estimated 
as a nonlinear function. Second, the thesis analyzes the 
ability of a presidential administration to improve its 
popularity level by exploiting a short-run Phillips curve. 
Finally, preference functions disaggregated by sex, race, 
political party, and geographical region are estimated. 
Presidential approval levels are proxied by monthly Gallup 
Poll approval data.
Chapter One serves as an overview of the current body 
of literature. While theoretical analyses of macroeconomic 
policy have traditionally assumed that the public’s social 
preference function is concave to the origin, in practice 
most empirical studies estimate a linear relationship 
between presidential popularity, inflation, and
unemployment.
The majority of the empirical work assumes that the 
impact of macroeconomic variables on political popularity 
remains constant across presidential regimes. Chapter Two 
applies appropriate tests for structural change to the data. 
The results indicate that structural change in economic 
perceptions does take place between presidential regimes and 
thus that each regime should be estimated separately.
The econometric study in Chapter Three examines the 
popularity of each president from Eisenhower to Reagan. For
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a majority of the presidential administrations) it
demonstrates that the public's trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment is nonlinear. This nonlinearity indicates 
that the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and 
unemployment varies with the relative rates of the
macroeconomic variables.
A major question of policy importance is whether or not 
an administration can increase its popularity in the short- 
run by exploiting a short-run Phillips curve. Chapter Four
estimates the Phillips curves and provides evidence that
while it is theoretically possible for a president to create 
a political business cycle, the gains in popularity are so 
small as to make the activity not worthwhile.
Chapter Five examines presidential approval on a
disaggregated level. There exists extensive Gallup Poll
data disaggregated by sex, race, political party, and
geographical region. Nonlinear social preference functions 
are estimated for each of these groups.




Introduction and Review of the Literature
1.1 An Overview
During the past two decades there has been a tremendous 
surge in interest in the interaction between the economy and 
political popularity. Both economists and political
scientists have examined the interdependencies in what has 
come to be known as the political business cycle. This 
thesis examines the role inflation and unemployment have 
played in determining presidential popularity from the 
Eisenhower administration through the Reagan regime. It 
also explores the extent to which a president may increase 
his popularity by manipulating the economy and creating a 
political business cycle.
Election returns express perhaps most definitively the 
public's assessment of the politician. Since elections are 
held at relatively long intervals, however, opinion polls 
serve as an intermediary gauge of public approval. Though 
these polls do not reflect precisely what election outcomes 
will be, they do provide a good measure of public sentiment.
A plethora factors influence the public’s assessment of 
a president. The public tends to hold the president 
responsible, rightly or wrongly, for both domestic and 
international issues and politicians recognize this. 
Mueller (1980, IB) quotes Lyndon B. Johnson:
1
I think Cmy grandchildren!] will be proud of two 
things. What I did for the Negro and seeing it 
through in Vietnam for all of Asia. The Negro
cost me 15 points in the polls and Vietnam cost me 
SO.
The sections which follow will examine in more detail the 
impact of "events'’ on popularity.
As economists* we are more concerned with the effects 
of the economy on popularity. Though the monetary and 
fiscal policies designed to affect the economy involve a 
joint effort by the President* the Congress and the Federal 
Reserve* the public nonetheless holds the president 
responsible to a large extent for the state of the economy. 
Tufte (1978* 5) gives evidence that politicians are well
aware of this fact. He quotes Walter Heller, chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisors from 1961 to 196A as 
saying,
As a political leader* President Johnson has found 
in modern economic policy an instrument that 
serves him well in giving form and substance to 
the stuff of which his dreams for America are 
made* in molding and holding a democratic 
concensus, and in giving that concensus a capital 
"D" in national elections. That chill of
recession may have tipped the Presidential 
election in 1960* and that the bloom of prosperity 
boosted the margin of victory in 196A, is widely 
acknowledged, especially by the defeated 
candidates.
Tufte (1978, 6) also indicates that Richard Nixon was
acutely aware of the impact of the economy on political 
popularity. He reproduces a portion of Nixon’s Six Crises i
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The power of the "pocket-book" issue was shown 
more clearly perhaps in 1958 than in any off-year 
election in history. On the international front, 
the Administration had had one of its best
years....Yet, the economic dip in October was 
obviously uppermost in the people’s minds when 
they went to the polls. They completely rejected 
the President’s appeal for the election of 
Republicans to the House and Senate.
Though many variables may be employed to represent
economic prosperity or malaise, perhaps the two mast
frequently chosen to proxy economic activity are inflation
and unemployment rates. These economic statistics are
widely available to the public on a consistent basis and
their effects are fairly well understood. Increases in 
either variable are seen as a worsening of the economy and 
thus cause popularity to decline.
The objective of the remainder of this chapter is to 
review the existing theoretical and empirical literature
dealing with the presidential popularity function and the 
social indifference map between inflation and unemployment 
which may be derived from it. As such, the chapter will 
survey only a very specialized portion of the political
business cycle literature. It excludes a lengthy discussion 
of the political business cycle itself and deals only with 
presidential popularity, excluding literature on 
Congressional election returns and a large body of work
examining the possibility of a political business cycle in 
the monetary supply.
Section 1.2 presents the theoretical underpinnings of 
the social preference function. Section 1.3 follows with a 
discussion of selected empirical works. This section 
examines treatment of the dependent variable, functional 
form, inclusion of economic and noneconomic variables by 
various researchers, and finally the estimation techniques 
employed. The chapter conclusions are presented in Section 
1.A which also paves the way for the empirical work to 
follow.
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Concave Social
Indifference Map
From a given presidential popularity function which 
includes inflation and unemployment, it is possible to 
derive a social preference curve. This curve presents all 
combinations of the two macroeconomic variables which yield 
a constant approval rating. The public's indifference map 
relating inflation and unemployment was first assumed to be 
concave to the origin by Lipsey <1965) who used a simple 
theory of choice model. He assumed that policymakers have a 
preference function which contains many factors, among them 
economic variables, specifically inflation and unemployment. 
The higher the rates of inflation and unemployment in a 
particular period, the lower the preference for the policy.
Nordhaus (1975) modified this analysis to assume that the 
public has a similar social preference function in which its 
approval of a president is dependent partially upon economic 
factors. Indifference curves, such as I*, Ie*> and I 3 in 
Figure 1.1, are drawn to reflect decreasing levels of 
collective approval as we move toward the origin.
Both inflation and unemployment have negative marginal 
utilities and the marginal rate of substitution between the 
two is negative; thus, the curves are downward sloping. In 
conventional utility theory, indifference curves are 
typically drawn convex to' the origin, but since the public 
is forced to choose between two "bads" in this case, the 
indifference curves are concave to the origin. At high 
rates of inflation and low rates of unemployment (the upper 
lefthand portion of the curve in Figure 1.1) the public will 
tolerate a relatively large increase in unemployment in 
return for reduced inflation. When inflation is relatively 
low and unemployment relatively high (the lower righthand 
portion of the curve in Figure 1.1), the public will not 
tolerate much additional unemployment to gain a lower 
inflation rate. This behavior causes the concavity of the 
social preference function.
The American public has made it clear that both 
unemployment and inflation are undesirable. Losses due to 
unemployment are relatively easy to pinpoint. As
unemployment rises, real GNP and real incomes fall. The
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costs of inflation are a bit more difficult to see directly,
yet the public has shown their displeasure with high
inflation rates by denying reelection to two recent 
incumbants, Ford and Carter, after experiencing large bursts 
of inflation. Some specific costs of inflation, though they 
are admittedly hard to quantify, include reduced purchasing 
power, the "shoe leather" costs of conserving money 
balances, the capricious redistribution of income from 
creditors to debtors, the losses due to the inability to 
correctly anticipate increases in inflation and adjust one’s 
economic behavior accordingly, and distortions due to a tax 
system which may not fully indexed. In addition, some 
individuals may not understand the relationship between 
income and rising prices and thus see higher prices as 
necessarily implying decreased real income.1
To summarize, each concave indifference curve
represents a locus of combinations of inflation and
unemployment which yield the same approval rating for the 
president. Since lower unemployment and inflation rates are
‘For more technical information see Laidler and Parkin
(1975), Okun (1975), and Nordhaus (1975); for a textbook 
discussion see Hall and Taylor (1988, ^87-491). Nordhaus
(1975, 172) points out the possibility that inflation may be 
a "bad" for the rational individual but not for society as a 
whole. Individuals may feel that inflation is a "tax" on
income which in the aggregate nets out to zero. As Nordhaus 
states, "...the price rises might be visible, while the 
offsetting effect of price rises on income— flowing through 
higher wage rates, dividends, and transfer payments— might 
not be associated with the inflationary process in the 
individual’s perception."
preferred to higher rates, curves closer to the origin 
represent higher approval ratings.
As Brechling (196B, 715) has pointed out, the above 
description is based upon two assumptions. First, the 
indifference curves depicted assume that the collective 
utility functions are analagous to those for individuals. 
While this is a "leap of faith" which some may not agree 
with,12 Brechling asserts that it is plausible if we assume 
enough "political freedom" so that a nation may arrive at a 
collective utility function which is like that of the 
individual. Second, the indifference map is drawn ceterus 
. *~ i bus, or assuming that all other factors influencing the 
public’s perceptions of the president remain unchanged. 
Changes in factors such as foreign policy, domestic 
violence, and other such issues may cause the curve to shift 
but do not determine the slope of the curve.
As was alluded to previously, Lipsey (1965) was one of 
the first to formally delineate the nonlinear relationship 
between the two economic variables, his work within the 
context of reducing unemployment to some "optimal" level. 
Brechling (1968) also utilized this tool in his more
ELepper, (1974, 68) for instance, identifies a
situation in which the "...constant vote curves V,, , are not 
smooth and need not be concave. The obvious case of non­
concavity occurs if voters’ preferences are polarized so 
that one group tolerates extreme values of [inflation! but 
not of U,...while another group has little tolerance for 
extreme values of [inflation! but tolerates very large U."
extensive look at the unemployment-inflation tradeoff with 
emphasis on the Phillips Curve relationship.
Perhaps one of the best known theoretical analyses 
employing the concave social preference function is 
Nordhaus’ (1975) "The Political Business Cycle." Nordhaus 
develops a model in which an administration attempts to 
maximize a quadratic vote function subject to the constraint 
of the short-run Phillips curve. In the short run a 
politician may increase his popularity by exploiting the 
short run Phillips curve, reducing unemployment and raising 
the inflation rate, thus improving popularity prior to an 
election. After the election as inflation expectations are 
revised upward thereby shifting the short run Phillips curve 
upward, the inflation rate rises, unemployment rises, and 
popularity once more falls. Textbook presentations of this 
political business cycle model may be found in Peston 
?7A), Westaway and Weyman-Jones (1977), Boyes <198*0 and 
Hall and Taylor (1986). Similar representations are found 
in MacRae (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
1.3 Empirical Estimation of the Presidential Popularity 
Function and the Social Preference Function 
This section attempts to highlight the various 
empirical issues associated with the presidential popularity 
function and to outline the manner in which researchers have 
chosen to address these issues. The selection of the
dependent variable will be examined first. Research will
then be broadly grouped by the emphasis placed on the 
regressors: major emphasis placed on time and noneconomic
events* major emphasis on economic events only* and joint 
emphasis on the economy and political events. Appendix I 
provides a brief summary of the information presented in the 
following section.
1.3.1 The Dependent Variable
By far, the most common measure of presidential 
approval is the percentage who respond "approve" to the 
Gallup Poll question "Do you approve or disapprove of the
way Mr. ________  is handling the job of president?" Of the
works sited in the following paragraphs* Meuller <1970), 
Stimson (1976), Kenski (1977ab), Frey and Schneider (1978), 
Golden and Poterba (1980), Chappell (1983), Chappell and 
Keech (1985ab), and Michaels (1986) employ quarterly 
measures of the series in time spans beginning as early as 
1953:1 and ending as late as 1980:A. Kernel 1 (1978), Monroe 
(1978, 1981), Ostrom and Simon (1985), and Peel and Jones 
(1987) all employ monthly data in time spans ranging from 
1953:1 to 1980:IS. Smyth, Washburn, and Dua (19B9ab) is the 
only work to extend the analysis to the Reagan 
administration.
Kenski (1977a), Norpoth and Yantek (1983), and Maloney 
and Smirlock (1981) use the first difference of the monthly
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Gallup popularity series as the dependent variable* thus 
seeking to explain changes in popularity rather than
absolute levels. Monroe (1984) employs first differences on 
a bi-monthly basis. Norpoth and Yantek indicate that they 
set the difference between the last month of an outgoing 
presidency and the first month of an incoming presidency 
equal to zero. Kenski and Maloney and Smirlock do not 
report having made such an adjustment.
Stimson’s (1976) dependent variable is yet another 
variation on the Gallup measure as his is the quarterly 
percentage approving as a portion of all those expressing an 
opinion. Since the precentage expressing no opinion remains 
fairly constant over time, however, this is not a major 
difference.
Shapiro and Conforto (1980a) use another variation of 
the Gallup measure. They employ the percentage change in 
those disapproving of the president’s performance derived 
from yearly data spanning 1947-1975. They exclude the 
change for 1950-51, 1973-74, and 1974-75 because these 
values were abnormally high without any apparent economic 
cause. This leaves them with a rather limited data set. In 
addition, they do not report having made any data adjustment 
at the beginning of a new administration so that the first 
year’s value for a new administration may be dependent upon 
the final popularity rating of an outgoing administration.
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Arguing that actual election outcomes are more relevant 
than opinion polls which are nonbinding, Fair (197B) uses as 
his dependent variable the percentage voting for a Democrat 
in presidential elections from 1916 to 1976. A major defect 
of this measure is that it allows only a limited data set of 
16 observations.
MacKuen <19B3) combines responses to Gallup* Harris, 
CBS-New York Times, NBC-Associated Press, and Roper survey 
questions to derive his approval measure. He feels that 
this larger number of observations taken from 1963 to 19B0 
provides greater precision. Though the question formats 
vary somewhat, he introduces dummy variables to account for 
the differences.
Smyth and Dua (19BB, 19B9) assert that while the Gallup 
measure has been widely used, it is not entirely 
satisfactory to the economist wishing to study the public’s 
reaction to inflation and unemployment. Gallup popularity 
is dependent upon noneconomic as well as economic factors 
and the noneconomic influences may dominate. Hhile one 
might include control variables to account for these 
political phenomenon, there are many political events which 
are difficult to account for empirically. As an alternative 
measure, they employ data gleaned from responses to the 
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan 
question "As to the economic policy of the government— I 
mean steps to fight inflation or unemployment— would you say
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the government is doing a good job, only fair, or a poor 
job?" "Government" in this context is interpreted to be
synonomous with the leader of the government, the president, 
though one might argue that this term might also apply to 
Congress as well. They utilize monthly data for the Reagan 
administration and quarterly data for the Nixon through 
Reagan years ending both analyses in November of 1986. This 
rating measure is superior from the economist’s viewpoint 
because it specifically highlight’s the public’s 
satisfaction with the president’s economic performance.
Kernel 1 (1978) and Smyth and Dua (1988a) include as a 
regressor a lagged dependent variable when using monthly 
data. Their argument is that the president’s approval
rating will respond slowly to changing events. During the 
short intervals between popularity polls the public may 
maintain their current assessment of the president
regardless of intervening events. Since Smyth and Dua use 
monthly data for one administration only, no adjustment is 
made in the data set. Kernel 1, however, does not report 
having deleted the first observation of each new
administration.
1.3.2 Popularity as Explained by Time or Political Events
One of the earliest pieces to empirically explore 
presidential popularity is Mueller’s often cited
"Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson" (1970).
Mueller posits that popularity will always decline over time 
due to a "coalition of minorities" effect. According to 
Mueller (1970, 20), “...this concept might inspire the
expectation that a President’s popularity would show a 
general downward trend as he is forced on a variety of 
issues to act and thus create intense* unforgiving opponents 
of former supporters." Empirically, the coalition of
minorities variable is represented by a time trend. Similar 
logic applies to the inclusion of time trends by Stimson
(1976) and Frey and Schneider (1978).
Mueller adds to the popularity function a "rally" 
variable capturing increases in popularity due to
international crises and similar events which give the
President a short-run increase in popularity. Though the
concept is pleasing theoretically, there are difficulties in 
forming the variable for empirical testing. Mueller (1970, 
SE) undertakes a rather complicated process of forming
"rally points" by examining news coverage of major 
international events. The rally variable is then measured 
as the length of time, in years, since the last rally point. 
The variable was formulated for the entire period as well as 
for each administration. Though the variable does provide 
some measure of political support due to international 
events and though it has been borrowed by several other 
researchers, its measurement is slightly arbitrary. Kernell
l*t
(1978) also employs this measure. In most cases the rally 
coefficient is insignificant or of marginal significance.
To capture the effect of the economy on presidential 
popularity, Mueller includes an "economic slump" variable. 
It is measured as the change in unemployment since the 
president took office and is expected to have a negative 
impact on popularity. If the current unemployment rate is 
lower than that existing when the president took office, 
then "economic slump" is given the value of 0. This 
implicly assumes that a president is punished if the economy 
worsens but is not rewarded if conditions improve. In 
addition, since no measure of inflation is included in the 
popularity function, the public is implicitly assumed to be 
unconcerned with this phenomenon.
Mueller estimates his model using quarterly Gallup Poll 
presidential approval data for the Truman through Johnson 
administrations. In addition to the variables discussed 
above, his most complete popularity function includes dummy 
variables representing each administration and binary "war" 
variables capturing the effects of American military 
intervention in Korea and Vietnam on popularity. Using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), Mueller found all the 
variables to be statistically significant with the exception 
of the Vietnam dummy. These results are subject to 
question, however, because of the presence of serial 
correlation for which no adjustment is made. Mueller’s
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basic conclusion) then) is that while economic and political 
events do effect popularity) a president is cursed by a 
popularity rating which declines constantly over time due to 
what he terms a "coalition of minorities".
Stimson (1976) modifies Mueller’s research by fitting a 
parabola to presidential approval rather than allowing a 
purely linear decline in popularity over time.. His basic 
model is a parabolic time trend to which he later adds 
Mueller’s economic slump) rally> and binary war variables. 
His conclusion (Stimson 1976) IB) is that the addition of 
"three such promising candidates for the explanation of 
presidential approval (fails) to disrupt the time/approval 
relationship and (adds) 1ittle...leads naturally to the 
suspicion that nothing else matters much (emphasis his)." 
Though Stimson nates the complications caused by positive 
serial correlation and multico11 inearity) no empirical 
adjustment is made for the problems.
Kernell (197B) casts serious doubt on research which
tinds the economy unimportant. He posits that previous work 
on presidential popularity places too much emphasis on time 
and that the results are generated largely by a mis- 
measurement of variables. He estimates a popularity 
function for each president from Truman to Nixon using
monthly data and allows for an adjustment process by
including a lagged dependent variable.
Kernel 1’s measurement of macroeconomic variables is far
more complete* employing six month changes in unemployment
and in the consumer price index. Additionally, the effect
of war is measured as the number of casualties during each
month for both Korea and Vietnam and as the number of 
bombing missions over North Vietnam per month, thus
modelling the public’s growing dissatisfaction with these 
military conflicts. Similar Vietnam casualty figures have 
been employed by Chappell (19B3), Chappell and Keech 
(1985ab) and Kenski (1977ab). The rally variable employed 
by both Meuller and Stimson is modified so that only 
international events are accounted for and these have an 
effect on popularity over a five-month period only. The 
honeymoon variable employed is analogous to that of Meuller.
The model is estimated for each administration by OLS
and serial correlation is corrected using an instrumental
variable technique developed by Malinvaud. The resulting 
unemployment coefficients are neither large nor significant, 
but the inflation coefficients are sizeable for a majority 
of the presidents, though not all are significant. MacKuen 
(1983) reports similar findings. According to Kernell
(1978, 18), these results "fail to establish the Iron Law of
the Economy, (but) they do inform us that changing economic 
conditions can have an important effect on the president’s 
public standing."
In a more recent attempt to analyze the effect of time 
on popularity^ Peel and Jones (1987) contrast the "electoral 
cycle effect" in which only time changes the approval rating 
with the "expected future benefits hypothesis" in which 
agents support the party which offers the largest net 
present value of expected future benefits. Popularity data 
for 19 parties in six countries as well as for U.S. 
presidential approval is transformed by an ARIMA (0,1,1) 
process. These series are then regressed on a number of 
variables designed to represent electoral-cycle effects. 
Such regression analysis appears to yield' some support far 
the electoral-cycle effect but, once more, the presence of
serial correlation makes reported t-values highly suspect.
The OLS regressions were repeated using the first difference 
of the popularity series as the dependent variable. After 
this adjustment to eliminate serial correlation, no 
electoral cycle variables were statistically significant.
Several researchers have focused on modelling the 
impact of political events, both domestic and international, 
on presidential popularity. While economic data are easily 
obtained and time trends easily formed, it is far more
difficult to quantify political events. Though arbitrary in 
nature, Mueller’s "rally ’round the flag" variable described 
above was one of the earliest attempts to empirically
measure the political atmosphere.
Ostrom and Simon (19B5) present one of the most 
comprehensive analyses of popularity as dependent upon 
"events." Their objective is to develop a generalized model 
which may be applicable to any president. Monthly Gallup 
popularity data from 1953:1-1980:12 are regressed upon 12 
broad factors including the economy, legislative success, 
conflict with the Soviet Union, war, social unrest, scandal, 
domestic and international policy, and personal events. 
These events are weighted by the extent of media coverage 
given the event and in some cases by the percentage of the 
population concerned with the event.
Ostrom and Simon estimate a simultaneous system by two- 
stage least squares in which popularity is assumed to be 
dependent upon legislative success and legislative success, 
in turn, is dependent upon the level of popularity. Serial 
correlation in the initial estimation leads to a correction 
using an ARIMA prewhitening procedure. They find that all 
variables in the popularity function are significant with 
the exception of social unrest and domestic policy. Foreign 
policy tends to play the largest role in determining 
popularity. In addition, there seems to be a potential 
"vicious cycle" between popularity and legislative 
efficiency as declines in popularity lead to declines in 
legislative success which in turn has a negative impact on 
approval.
As with Meuller’s rally variable* the measurement of 
many of the unanticipated events determined through 
newspaper searches may be somewhat arbitrary. In addition* 
the results may be distorted because the measurement of the 
economy is not satisfactory. The impact of the economy on 
approval is represented by a misery index (the rate of 
inflation plus the rate of unemployment) multiplied by the 
percentage of Gallup poll survey participants citing either 
variable as the top problem facing the country. This 
measure is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First* it 
understates the impact of the economy on popularity as many 
people who reveal that another problem is of highest 
priority are nonetheless concerned with the state of the 
economy. Second* employing a misery index implicitly 
assumes that inflation and unemployment have equal impacts 
on popularity. This restriction is not necessarily
appropr iate.
1.3.3 Popularity as Explained Solely by the Economy
Several researchers have focused exclusively upon the 
role the economy plays in determining presidential 
popularity. Among these are Kenski (1977ab)* Shapiro and 
Conforto (19B0ab)» and Michaels ( 1906) .
Kenski (1977a) endeavors to find the "correct11 measures 
of inflation and unemployment to be used in the popularity 
function by utiliEing a series of univariate regressions. 
He regresses monthly Gallup approval data from the
Eisenhower to Nixon administrations on various measures of 
unemployment and inflation both for the entire time period 
and for each individual administration. The inflation and 
unemployment measures analyzed are a monthly rate, a six- 
month moving average, and changes in each of the previous 
values. Inflation is measured by both the consumer price 
index and as the change in food prices. Kenski finds that 
unemployment is often of the wrong sign and statistically 
significant. With respect to inflation, he concludes that 
the change in the six month moving average of general prices 
is the best measure.
Kenski's work is subject to several criticisms. First, 
no consideration is given to any influence on popularity 
other than economic. In the regression covering the entire 
time period, no dummy variables representing various 
administrations, honeymoon effects, Watergate, or Vietnam 
are included, variables which have proven significant in 
other research. The exclusion of relevant variables can 
lead to serious misspecifications of the relationship. In 
addition, no correction is made for serial correlation 
though it is mentioned as a potential problem in the closing 
statement. Though he states that the note isn’t intended to 
be definitive but rather suggestive of the measurement of 
unemployment and inflation, correction of these 
methodological discrepancies might well alter his 
conclusions.
In a very similar piece* Kenski <1977b) attempts to 
analyze the impact of inflation on popularity. He isolates 
inflation because it is consistently significant in previous 
literature while unemployment is often statistically 
insignificant and because inflation affects a larger portion 
of the population than does unemployment. As a dependent 
variable, Kenski employs quarterly Gallup data from 1953:1- 
1974:4 measured as the level of approval and as the change 
in approval over the quarter. Two measures of inflation are 
examined: a six month moving increase in general prices and
in food prices. He eliminates the first six months of each 
new administration in order to form the six-month moving 
average. The model is estimated by QLS for the entire 
period and for each administration. This work does improve 
on the previous article cited because two political dummies 
are included: a "rally" variable and a war variable both as
defined by Mueller. However, no attention is given to 
presidential dummy varibles in the regressions for the 
entire period and the effect of Watergate on the Nixon 
administration is omitted.
With respect to results, the equations employing the 
change in popularity exhibit no serial correlation, but most 
variables, including the inflation variables, are 
insignificant. For the level of approval, inflation is 
statistically significant but this result is marred by the 
presence of autocorrelation. Kenski (1977b, B9> concludes
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that "although the theoretical case for the impact of 
inflation on presidential popularity is appealing? it is not 
borne out by an empirical analysis which posits linear 
relationships."
Shapiro and Conforto <1980a) emphasize the importance 
of economic perceptions as a criterion for evaluating 
presidential performance. The major innovation in their 
work is the inclusion in the popularity function of a 
variable which reflects the percentage of people who feel 
they are worse off now <WN) financially than they were a 
year ago? as gleaned from the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Popularity is regressed on WN in addition to the yearly 
change in quarterly averages of inflation and unemployment. 
Due to the use of first differences? serial correlation 
presents no problem. Shapiro and Conforto find both of the 
economic variables as well as the WN perception variable to 
be statistically significant? indicating that both public 
impressions of the economy as well as actual values of 
economic variables affect presidential popularity.
Kenski (1980) notes several deficiencies in the 
preceding analysis. First? the authors all but ignore 
political variables? thus artifically inflating the 
importance of the economic variables. No distinctions are 
made by administration or presidential term. While this is 
a valid criticism? it is somewhat ironic that Kenski’s own 
work cited above suffers the same shortcoming. Kenski
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argues that with such a small data set more statistical 
tests should be conducted to verify results. Third, he 
asserts that the exclusion of outliers is done on a purely 
arbitrary basis and that this exclusion may play a major 
role in the final results. Finally, he points out that the 
inflation and unemployment variables are necessarily highly 
correlated with the “worse now" variable, thus including 
both is inappropriate and redundant.
The role of anticipated versus unanticipated inflation 
in determining presidential popularity is the subject of 
Michaels (1986). He asserts that if all inflation is 
anticipated, money will be neutral and thus inflation would 
have no noticeable impact on popularity. Inflation’s 
redistributive effects are felt only If it is unanticipated 
thus this is the single case in which inflation will affect 
approval.
Michaels examines two models which assume extreme forms 
of voter recall. The first assumes that a president’s 
popularity level depends upon current levels of inflation 
and unemployment only while the second assumes that voters 
evaluate the president on the basis of his entire past 
performance in the current term. Regressions for the first 
model include various combinations of unemployment, 
anticpated inflation, unanticipated inflation, tax payments, 
and presidential intercept and slope dummies as dependent 
variables. For the regression including all of these
£4
rate was significantly negative, 
anticipated inflation have negative 
on significance, and there is no
that the second model which assumes 
is superior to the myopic model 
variables were significant, the Durbin-Watson 
acceptable, and the model produces generally 
R12 terms. The most surprising finding to 
analysis is the possibility that popularity 
inflation is anticipated. Both models may 
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all of which have been found significant
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individual presidency shows a significant impact in a few 
cases but not a majority. Their model tends to downplay the 
impact of economic variables on the economy) but this may 
stem from the framework within which they have chosen to 
analyze the problem. They note (Norpoth and Yantek 1983, 
801-802) some of the problems associated with applying Box- 
Jenkins models to the popularity series.
In two very similar papers, Monroe (1978, 19B1) asserts 
that a lag structure in the presidential popularity function 
may be more adequately represented within an Almon lag 
model. Employing monthly data from 1950:1-1974:4, she 
examines the 24-month lagged effect of unemployment, 
inflation, real personal income, Standard and Poors Index, 
military expenditures, trade balance, and market interest 
rates on popularity, with the last two variables included in 
the later paper only. The basic conclusions of both papers 
are that Almon lag models are indeed superior to simple lag 
models and that while inflation and military expenditures 
significantly impact popularity all other variables, 
including unemployment, are insignificant.
Monroe’s results may be criticized on several grounds. 
First, her results are not subjected to any rigorous 
significance tests. In addition, since the Almon lags 
extend back 24 periods, the model may implicitly assume that 
a current president may be held responsible for economic 
conditions created by his predecessors. Finally, as has
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been the case with all the research reported in this 
eectioni Monroe’s work cannot be seen as complete because it 
ignores political events and personality factors as 
determinants of presidential popularity.
1.3.A Popularity Models Emphasizing Both Economic and
Noneconomic Factors
The studies cited above emphasize the impact of time, 
political events, or the economy in isolation on popularity. 
While each has merit in its own right, a common flaw is that 
no popularity function may be seen as complete without 
including a combination of these variables. In the past 
several years Frey and Schneider (1978), Fair (1978), Golden 
and Poterba (1980), Chappell (1983), MacKuen (19B3) and 
Chappell and Keech (1985ab) have attempted to develop a more 
holistic approach which includes economic as well as 
political measures in the popularity function.
Frey and Schneider (1978) and Golden and Poterba (1980) 
both examine the popularity function within the broader 
context of a politico-economic system which also includes a 
policy reaction function, though their conclusions with 
respect to the political business cycle are divergent. Frey 
and Schneider conclude that a political business cycle does 
exist, while Golden and Poterba cast doubt on the importance 
of the hypothesis as an explanation of macroeconomic policy. 
Since the popularity function is the issue of salience to
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this thesis* only that portion of the two papers will be
discussed here.
Frey and Schneider employ quarterly Gallup data from 
1953:2-1975:2 to estimate a popularity function by OLS. 
Their regressors include measures for the popularity level 
of each president* a Watergate variable* and a Mueller-like 
coalition-of-minorities variable to measure popularity 
depreciation for each president. To model the impact of the 
economy, they include measures for lagged inflation, 
unemployment* and growth in consumption, though one of the 
variables is alternatively dropped to reduce the effects of 
multico11 inearity. After correcting for serial correlation, 
they find that both inflation and unemployment significantly 
affect popularity. Thus, they conclude that Mueller’s 
(1970) specification of the popularity function which 
includes only unemployment in the regression equation is
incorrect.
The popularity function estimated by Golden and Poterba 
^sing Gallup poll data from 1953:2-1978:4 is similar to that 
formulated by Frey and Schneider. As political measures,
they include a variable measuring the number of quarters
since the President took office to reflect a "honeymoon" 
effect or a "coalition of minorities" effect suggested by 
Mueller and a binary Watergate variable from 1973:2-1974:2. 
In addition, binary presidential dummy variables were
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including to capture "personality" effects of each 
president.
Six lagged values of inflation* present and three 
lagged values of unemployment* and the lagged change in real 
disposable income are included as measures of the economy. 
Although the inclusion of lagged economic terms allows the 
public to be less myopic in their evaluation of the
President* including lagged values in this manner implicitly 
credits a current administration with the inflation or 
unemployment rates existing in a previous administration. 
In a procedure similar to that followed by Frey and 
Schneider* one economic variable is dropped in turn to help 
reduce multico11 inearity. The original OLS estimates showed 
presence of serial correlation so correction was made 
through the use of the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Their 
results show that while inflation significantly influences 
popularity* unemployment does not.
Fair <1978) employs a model far different from any
described heretofore. Rather than analyzing the levels of 
popularity throughout the administration* he is interested 
in actual votes in presidential elections. His purpose is 
to provide a general model within which many of the theories
of voting behavior may be examined and then to use this
model to analyze the effect of the economy on votes for 
President. Rather than utilizing Gallup poll data* he uses 
as his dependent variable the percentage voting for a
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Democrat in presidential elections from 1916-1976, a total
of only 16 observations. Using the unemployment rate, real 
GNP per capita, and the GNP deflator, he creates 16 economic 
measures including levels, rates of change, and rates of 
change over extended periods. In some equations only one
variable is included while in others two variables are
employed. A time trend, a measure of each candidate’s
independent vote-getting ability, and a variable designed to 
see if an incumbant has an advantage in running for 
reelection are also included in the nonlinear estimation of 
the popularity function.
Fair finds that the change in real GNP or the change in 
unemployment significantly affect votes for president but 
that other measures do not. In addition, voters are found 
to have a very high discount rate, indicating that they are 
extremely myopic. They do not consider the past performance 
of a nonincumbant party and only consider the events within 
the year of the election for the incumbant party.
Though Fair includes many statistical tests of his 
model, it is difficult to make strong conclusions from a 
data set which includes only 16 observtations. In addition, 
it is somewhat disconcerting that the largest errors occur 
in the last two elections.
Chappell <1983) and Chappell and Keech (1985a) develop 
a unique model for explaining presidential approval which 
assumes that the voter is "sophisticated" in that he knows
both the short run and long run outcomes of policies and is 
concerned with the future as well as with current and past 
economic performance. The voter is aware of optimal
monetary and fiscal policy and punishes the incumbant for 
deviations from that optimal policy. The popularity
function becomes quite complicated: it includes a loss
function to account for the deviation from optimal policy, 
honeymoon variables for the first six quarters, a variable 
reflecting the number killed in each quarter in Vietnam, a 
Watergate variable, and dummy variables for each president. 
In addition, in Chappell and Keech <1985a) the economic
variables are weighted by <1) a dummy assuring that
performance of the previous administration does not reflect 
in the evaluation of the current administration and (2) a 
variable reflecting the increasing importance attached to 
average performance as time in office accumulates.
The models are estimated using nonlinear least squares 
and are corrected for serial correlation. Comparison is 
made with "naive” models in which inflation and unemployment 
are included linearly. In Chappell and Keech (1985a) 
regressions are included for both aggregate popularity and 
for disaggregated portions of society. Their research 
supports the sophisticated model as the results for the 
naive model were consistently weaker.
MacKuen (1983) compares the public’s responsiveness to 
changing economic conditions with responsiveness to dramatic
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political events from 1963-1980. He finds that the two have 
equal influence on popularity. With respect to economic 
conditions* he finds that unemployment has a larger 
immediate impact on popularity than inflation* but its 
impact is not long felt. When the "persistence of the 
impact" is examined* he finds that inflation is considerably 
more important.
Smyth and Dua (19B8* 1989) note that while theoretical 
analyses establish that the social indifference map between 
inflation and unemployment derived from the presidential 
popularity function is concave to the origin* empirical 
research has failed to estimate the popularity function in a 
manner consistent with this assertion.3 Employing monthly 
economic approval data from February of 198S to November of 
1986 described in Section 1.3.1* they (1988a) regress the 
popularity measure on inflation and unemployment lagged and 
a lagged dependent variable. As such, this excludes the 
honeymoon period and ends before the Iran-Contra scandal, 
thus eliminating the need for dummy variables. They employ 
a Box-Cox transformation to estimate the nonlinear
Pepper (1974) derives a nonlinear "constant vote 
curve" assuming satisficing behavior on the part of 
individuals. When empirically estimating a popularity 
function, however, she allows inflation and unemployment to 
enter the voting function linearly. Keech (19B0) recognizes 
the nonlinear relationship between inflation and 
unemployment in a review paper outlining the effects of 
electoral politics on economic policy-making. Like Lepper* 
however, his later empirical works with Chappell C1985ab) do 
not reflect this knowledge as the economic variables enter 
the popularity function linearly.
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relationship since it does not impose rigid restrictions on 
the form of the public’s utility function. With all 
variables statistically significant and with no indication 
of serially correlated errors* their research finds the 
nonlinear model superior to a linear one.
In (19S9), Smyth and Dua again employ the Michigan
Survey data but in quarterly form from 1971:2 to 1986:*t.
The nonlinear relationship is estimated by regressing 
approval rating on unemployment, unemployment squared, and 
inflation via ordinary least squares. They also include a 
honeymoon effect and a dummy variable for Watergate which 
takes the value of 1 for 1973:1 to 1975:1. Finally, to test 
the belief that President Reagan is fundamentally mare
popular than either Nixon, Ford, or Carter, they include a 
variable N which takes the value of 0 for observations in 
the Reagan administration and 1 for observations in either 
of the other administrations. All variables were
statistically significant and serial correlation was not 
present.
Maloney and Smirlock (19B1) also estimate the social 
preference function as concave to the origin. By totally 
differentiating a quadratic popularity function (inflation 
and unemployment included in squared form), they estimate 
the following:
dV„ = aPudP-b + /JUbdU-b + dfl*
33
where V*, is popularity, P* is inflation in time t and U t is 
the unemployment rate- fit contains three binary dummy 
variables chosen to explain large residuals when the 
regression is run including only the economic variables. 
They estimate the model from using Gallup data from 1975:1 
to 1976:4 and find all variables to be statistically 
significant. Our attempts to replicate Maloney and 
Smirlock’s results, however, have been fruitless. Even when 
modifying their stated pattern somewhat we have been unable 
to achieve significant coefficients for either economic 
var iable.
1.4 Summary
The research presented within this chapter is quite 
varied in the approaches taken in estimating presidential 
popularity. The choice of economic and noneconomic 
variables included in the popularity function varies widely 
as do the empirical techniques employed. As noted earlier, 
Appendix I presents the differences of the major works in 
tabular form. Though broad generalizations are difficult, 
there are several statements which may be made regarding the 
state of the current research.
(11 Though the vast majority of research has employed 
Gallup Poll data, none of this work has extended the 
analysis past the Carter administration. Smyth and Dua
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<1988, 1989) have examined the Reagan administration using 
Michigan Survey economic approval data, but no published 
research has appeared employing Gallup data for the Reagan 
years. Monthly Gallup data through December of 1988 is now 
available and should be incorporated into current research 
efforts.
(8) The theoretical literature clearly indicates that 
the social indifference map between inflation and 
unemployment is concave to the origin. With few exceptions, 
however, empirical researchers have failed to estimate the 
presidential popularity function in such a manner as to 
yield these nonlinear curves.
(3) Empirical analyses of the public’s social 
preference function typically estimate the function over 
several presidential administrations, thus assuming that no 
structural change in the economic variables occurs over 
time. While several researchers allow for shifts in the 
intercept through presidential dummies, most do not allow 
for changes in the slope of the preference function. Those 
which estimate each administration individually do not 
justify this action with rigorous stability tests.
(4) The political business cycle models of Nordhaus 
(1975), MacRae (1977), Tufte (1978) and Barro and Gordon 
<1983) assume that a president attempts to maximize a 
popularity function subject to the constraint of the short- 
run Phillips curve by reducing unemployment and raising the
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inflation rate. After the election as inflation
expectations are revised upward* the inflation rate rises 
and popularity falls.
While Frey and Schneider (1978) and Golden and Poterba 
(1980) among others have sought to determine if such a 
pattern is to be observed over an election cycle, there is 
no empirical evidence directed to the question as to whether 
or not there are really any worthwhile gains to be obtained 
from an administration creating a political business cycle.
The following chapters of this thesis will seek to 
address these deficiencies in the current literature. 
Gallup Poll data on presidential popularity will be employed 
from the Eisenhower to the Reagan administrations. The 
presidential popularity function will be estimated in such a 
manner as to generate a social indifference map which is 
concave to the origin. Within a sets of equations framework 
the thesis will present empirical support for the hypothesis 
that structural shifts in the coefficients of the economic 
variables of the social preference function do occur over 
time* indicating that separate preference functions should 
be estimated for each administration. The thesis will 
examine the gains in terms of increased popularity to be 
accrued from creating a political business cycle by 
exploiting an expectations augmented short-run Phillips 
curve. Finally* popularity functions disaggregated by race,
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Structural Change in the Presidential Popularity Function
As the review of the current literature in Chapter 1 
indicates, most empirical analyses of presidential 
popularity estimate the function across several regimes. In 
doing so, they implicitly assume that the public’s 
preferences toward inflation and unemployment remain 
constant over time. It is quite possible, however, that 
there has been a shift in the public’s perceptions over time 
such that inflation rates or unemployment rates which were 
once considered a political liability would now be 
considered moderate. In addition, the public may hold 
different presidents responsible to a differing degree for
the state of the economy due to differing campaign promises, 
extent of cooperation from Congress and the Federal Reserve 
and other factors. Therefore, this chapter explores a model 
of structural change in which all coefficients are allowed 
to vary for each administration.
Section 2.1 presents a description of the data to be 
used in this empirical investigation. Section 2.2 includes 
the initial model which estimates the popularity function 
over the entire time period. Several widely used tests for 
structural change are discussed in Section 2.3. The sets of
equations model for structural change is presented in
Section 2.4 as well as the results of this test.




The -following variables are used in our analysis of 
presidential popularity:
Y = presidential popularity;
Y_i = presidential popularity lagged one month;
P = inflation rate;
U = unemployment rate;
Honey - dummy trend variable representing a president’s 
initial honeymoon period with the public;
Killed = number killed per month in the Vietnam 
conflict;
Water = dummy variable representing the Watergate 
scanda1;
Iran = dummy variable reflecting the Iran-Contra 
affair;
D t. = binary dummy variable for each president to 
capture personality influences on popularity;
€ = disturbance term;
The presidential popularity data employed as the 
dependent variable is the percentage who responded "approve" 
to the Gallup Poll question "Do you approve or disapprove of
the way Mr. ______  is handling the job of President?" We
utilize monthly data from 1953:2 to 19BB:11. When more than 
one poll was undertaken in any month* we take the average of 
the polls during that month. Upon several occasions there 
were no approval ratings provided. If only one observation
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is missing, we take an average of the values immediately 
preceding and following the missing point. However, if two 
or more consecutive data points are missing, we feel 
interpolation is inappropriate and thus leave a gap in the 
data.1 We also delete the observation for December 1988, 
President Reagan’s last full month in office. We feel the 
sharp increase in the approval rating for that month, 63’/. in 
December up from 57V. in November, reflects a benevolent or 
sentimental farewell to a fairly popular president rather 
than any real economic improvement.e
Since the model is estimated using monthly data, we 
include a lagged dependent variable, Y-!, as a regressor. 
This allows popularity to adjust to changes in inflation and 
unemployment with a partial adjustment process. Due to the 
use of this lagged dependent variable, we reserve the first 
observation of each new presidency for the lag.
The inflation rate, P, is the inflation rate over the 
past twelve months calculated from the consumer price index, 
all urban consumers, all items, expressed as a percentage. 
The unemployment measure, U, is the percentage of unemployed 
civilian workers 16 years and older, seasonally adjusted.
*No interpolations are made for the following dates: 
1955:9-1955:10, 1956:9-1956:10, 1963:12, 1964:7-1964:10,
1968:12, 1972:7-1972:10, 1976:7-1976:11, and 1987:9-1987:11. 
Gaps are left for these time periods.
aWe feel this deletion is justified. When we
forecasted the 1988:12 value from our existing model and the 
predicted value was 53.5, significantly smaller than the 
actual value.
<+1
Both P and U are lagged one month to represent the most 
recent inflation and unemployment information known to the 
public. The indifference map between inflation and
unemployment is found by solving the popularity function for 
inflation at a constant popularity rating. In order to 
cause the resulting indifference map to be concave to the 
origin» we include both of the economic variables as squared 
terms and estimate the social preference function as a 
quadrat ic.
Table 2.1 presents the maximum and minimum inflation 
and unemployment rates experienced by each administration as 
well as the maximum and minimum popularity ratings. Figures 
2.1-2.5 reinforce this information by presenting the path of 
popularity for over time for Eisenhower» Kennedy-Johnson, 
Nixon-Ford) Carter and Reagan, respectively. Eisenhower’s 
popularity at its highest reached 79*/. and never fell below 
49V,. The highest popularity rating granted Kennedy-Johnson) 
80.5%, came at the beginning of the Kennedy administration 
and the lowest rating, 35.0% came just prior to the end of
Johnson’s term. The highest approval rating attained during
the Nixon—Ford terms was £7 % and the lowest was 2 V/« just 
before Nixon’s resignation. Carter’s popularity was
extremely high early in his administration, but his lowest
rating, 27%, came shortly before his bid for reelection.
Note that this low rating coincided with the highest 
unemployment rate attained during the administration.
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Though Reagan has been considered somewhat of an enigma in 
his ability to maintain consistently high popularity 
ratings, his popularity figures are surprisingly similar to 
his Republican precedessors and were lower than the extreme 
figures cited for Eisenhower. It is again of interest to 
note that Reagan’s lowest popularity rating was granted when 
unemployment was at its highest level during the entire 
administration? his rating was 36.7V. when unemployment 
reached its highest level of 10.8*/ in December of 1982 and 
January of 1983. Even in the midst of the Iran-Contra 
affair Reagan’s popularity never fell below 40*/..
The model includes several non-economic variables 
designed to capture other influences on popularity. A 
honeymoon variable. Honey, is included to reflect that the 
public understands that the economic conditions which 
persist during the first few months of an administration are 
not attributable, either positively or negatively, to the 
new president’s economic policies. The honeymoon variable 
for Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan takes the 
value of 11 in the second month of an administration’s 
tenure, declining to 1 at the end of the first year and then 
taking the value of 0 thereafter.3
3Several other formulations of the honeymoon variable 
are explored in Chapter 3. The formulation presented here 
is found to be at least as good as or superior to the other 
spec ificat ions.
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The variable Killed represents the number of Americans 
killed in action per month during the Vietnam Conflict 
spanning 1965:1-1968: IE.'■* The negative impact of the 
Watergate scandal on the Nixon administration is captured by 
the dummy variable Water which takes a value of 1 from 
1973:4-1974:7, a value of .5 in 1974:0 since Nixon’s 
resignation came early in that month, and a value of 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable Iran reflects the impact of 
the Iran-Contra affair on the Reagan administration and 
takes the value of 1 from 1986:13-1987:11 and 0 otherwise.® 
Finally, following Mueller <1970), Golden and Poterba 
£1980), Chappell (1983), Chappell and Keech <19B5) and 
others, a dummy variable for each administration, , is 
included to capture elements of popularity singular to each 
president.
Certainly there are many other noneconomic factors 
which influence presidential popularity such as domestic
'•Vietnam casualty figures are gleaned from Milstein 
(1974). The casualty figures are available through 
September of 1970. Preliminary research indicates that the 
Killed variable is far from significant for the Nixon-Ford 
administration, however, so we ended the series with 
1968:12, the end of the Kennedy-Johnson administration. 
MacKuen (1983, 173) also includes a Vietnam variable for the 
Kennedy-Johnson time period only, arguing that "Nixon’s 
reduction of the war effort...was not translated into 
approval, and given the politics of the period, this is not 
surpr ising."
“We experimented with other formulations of each of 
these dummy variables in preliminary research and found 
those presented here to be clearly superior. The results of 
this sensitivity analysis are to be found in Chapter 3.
unrest and handling of other international events. 
Unfortunately) these factors are quite difficult to quantify 
in a meaningful manner for empirical use. In order to keep 
the model as simple as possible) Me choose to limit the 
dummy variables to those capturing the major political 
events described above. The effect of other noneconomic 
factors will be seen in the error term. The high adjusted 
RE terms reported in the work which follows and the lack of 
serial correlation cause us to feel that the model is well 
specified.
2.2 The Initial Model
As mentioned in the preceding section) we include both 
of the economic variables as squared terms in order to allow 
the indifference map to be concave to the origin and 
estimate the social preference function as a quadratic of 
the following form:
Y = Go + ftiY_i + ilaHoney + feF® + Killed + C2.1)
fl^Water + flvlran + EF« i.D t + €
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) in Time Series Processor <TSP>. A possible objection 
to the use of OLS is that the dependent variable is 
constrained to lie between zerot all respondents 
disapproving or having no opinion of the president’s
^5
performance, and a maximum of 100, with all respondents 
approving of the president's performance. This may 
potentially result in predictions which lie outside the 
theoretical interval. Indeed it is a possible problem not 
only here but in all the studies using presidential
popularity data cited in Chapter 1. Smyth and Dua <1988b), 
Michaels <1986, n. 6), MacKuen <1983, n. 6) and Mueller 
<1979, n.10) recognize this problem as well. They suggest 
the alternative use of a probit model which would constrain 
the dependent variable to lie within the <0,100) interval. 
Since popularity never fell below 2V/. or went above SO'/i and 
since the values predicted by the model all lie in the 0 to 
100 range, we feel there is no real constraint which would 
make OLS estimation inappropriate.
The results of the OLS estimation are presented in 
Table 2.2. In addition to the estimated parameters, we
report the t-statistics in parentheses, the Re adjusted for
degrees of freedom, the standard error of the regression,
and the Durbin h-statistic. The Reagan administration is 
used as the base for the model. With the exception of 
several of the presidential dummies, all of the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 95*/. 
confidence level. The Durbin h-statistic is not significant
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indicating that there is no evidence of serial correlation 
of the residuals.^
With the exception that it includes the economic 
variables in their squared form* this model is quite similar 
to many presented in the literature. It would be tempting 
to conclude from this analysis that the model works for all 
presidencies with the inclusion of presidential intercept 
dummies. However* this model implicitly assumes that the 
public’s perceptions toward inflation and unemployment have 
remained constant over time when this may not have been so. 
Perceptions toward both inflation and unemployment have 
changed over time. Additionally* the public may hold 
presidents responsible to a differing degree for the state 
of the economy due to differences in campaign promises* 
party affiliations* and cooperation from the Federal Reserve 
and Congress. The following sections present several
rigorous tests of the hypothesis that responses to inflation 
and unemployment by the public differ by administration.
5.3 Tests for Structural Change
6In computing the Durbin-Watson d-statistic, TSP 
automatically adjusts for gaps in the data. Since this h- 
statistic is calculated from the d-statistic reported by 
TSP, it is also properly adjusted for gaps. The Durbin h 
and d statistics only check for the presence of first-order 
serial correlation. By computing the Durbin m-statistic, 
however, one may check for higher order correlation. When 
we conducted this test to check for up to fourth-order 
correlation* none was present.
<♦7
There are several methods -for testing for structural 
change presented in the literature. This section examines 
three of them: the Chow test, the Brown-Durbin-Evans Cusum
Squares, and a dummy variable model as presented by 
Gujaradi.
2.3.1 The Chow Test
Perhaps the most widely used method of testing for 
differences between two regressions is the Chow <1960) test. 
In implementing the Chow test, two separate regressions are 
run allowing the parameters to differ between the two time- 
periods. An unconstrained sum of squared errors (SSE) is 
formed by summing the SSEs from the two separate 
regressions. A third regression is run on all the data 
(from both time periods) constraining the parameters to be 
the same in both periods. This regression yields a 
constrained SSE. An P-statistic is then formed as follows:
CSSE(constrained) - SSEtunconstrained)3/K (2.2)
SSE<unconstrained)/(Ti + Te - HK)
•K ■ n+nt-EK
where K is the number of parameters, T i is the number of 
observations in the first period and Ta is the number of 
observations in the second period. The null hypothesis for 
this test is that the regressors in both equations are 
equal. The test as described above is designed for testing
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the equality of regressors in two subgroups. It may be 
extended to more than two equations without difficulty.'7
A major drawback of the Chow test is that it is not 
easily applicable to a test of equality of only some but not 
all regression coefficients. The Chow test does not 
indicate specifically which coefficient* intercept or slope, 
is different or whether both are different in the two (or 
more) subgroups. In addition* in order to apply the Chow 
test the regressors in both subgroups must be the same.
Since one objective of this chapter is to indicate
structural change in the economic variables and since there 
are noneconomic factors specific to several of the 
administrations, the use of the Chow test in examining
structural change in the presidential popularity function is 
inappropr iate.
2.3.2 The Brown-Durbin-Evans Cusum Test
The Brown Durbin Evans (1975) test is a more complex 
test for structural stability which relies on a graphical 
technique for determining departures from constancy. It 
relies upon plots of cumulative sums and sums of squares of 
recursive residuals to indicate stability.
Consider the basic model
^ For more information on the Chow Test see Kennedy 
(1985) and Kmenta (1986).
A9
Y* = X*<3* + Ut (2.3)
where Y-t, is a vector of the dependent variable* X*, is a
matrix of regressors* (3* a vector of coefficients and u* an
error vector assumed to be independent and normally-
distributed with with mean zero and variances erf, t =
1 T. The null hypothesis of constancy over time is then
given by
fin = " ... = = (3 < 2. A )
orf — £r M = ... = trf = o«
Brown-Durbin-Evans indicate that it seems natural to
examine OLS residuals* but that these residuals are not 
sensitive to small or gradual changes in (Is. They suggest 
the use of cumulative sum* or cusum* techniques* but even 
these are difficult to work with in their unstandardized
form. As a result* they advocate the use of recursive
residuals which allow one to look at the problem in terms of 
standardized cusums and cusums of squares of independent
N(0 , variables.
According to Kennedy (1985, 7A), "The nth recursive
residual is the error in predicting the nth observation 
using parameters estimated from a linear regression 
employing the first n-1 observations." Brown-Durbin-Evans 
show that if (3* is constant until time t= 0  and differs from
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this value from then on, the recursive residual <Wt- ) will 
have zero means until time t0  but nonzero means after that.
The test for structural change involves calculating the 
cusum of the recursive residuals, plotting them against time 
and determining if the path of the cusum of the recursive 
residuals deviates from its mean. A pair of lines 
symmetrically above and below the mean value are drawn such 
that the probability of crossing one or both of the lines is 
a, the required significance level. If the plotted cusum 
quantity remains within the significance boundaries, the 
null hypothesis of no structural change cannot be rejected. 
If, however, the plotted cusum crosses the boundaries, a 
structural break is determined to occur at that point.Q
A merit of employing the Brown-Durbin-Evans test is 
that the plot of the recursive residuals allows the 
researcher to determine the exact point of structural break 
if this information is not known a priori. Thus, the use of 
this test would not require that we impose a structural 
break at the beginning of each new administration. The test 
would indicate the appropriate point or points of the break.
There are, however, two major drawbacks from employing 
the Brown, Durbin, Evans test in the current situation. 
First, the computer package available to us for conducting
BSee Brown-Durbin-Evans (1975) for further information 
on the calculation of significance levels and interpretation 
of the plotted cusum quantity. They also give details of a 
cusum squared test which complements the one presented here.
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the test, D-FIT, does not accommodate binary dummy variables 
in the Brown* Durbin, Evans test. Second, as with the Chow 
test, it is impossible from the test to determine the source 
of the structural shift. Whether the break is caused from 
intercept or slope factors cannot be ascertained from this 
test. Once again, since determining the source of 
structural change is the major objective of this chapter, 
the Brown Durbin Evans test doesn’t provide the information 
we seek.
2.3.3 The Dummy Variable Approach 
2.3.3a The Basic Dummy Variable Model
Gujaradi <1970ab) presents a dummy variable approach to 
the structural change question.**’ If we assume two time
periods and only one regressor, the observations are pooled 
together and the following equation is estimated:
Yj, = <xj + o(e:Di + Xy + |3g»(DiXt) + Ui (2.5)
where Y* and Xj, are the dependent variable and regressor 
respectively and where Da. = 1 for observations in the first 
period and zero for observations in the second period.
vThis model is also referred to as the multiple 
interrupted time series (MITB) model. There are many 
examples of its use, two of which are Garand and Gross 
(1984) and Garand (1985).
5a
In the above equation* Gujaradi refers to ot& as the 
differential intercept and as the differential slope
coefficient. These values indicate how much the intercept
and slope coefficients, respectively, of the first period 
differs from the intercept and slope coefficient of the 
second period. If the differential intercept term is 
significant, structural change may be attributed to the 
intercept term only. If the differential slope coefficient 
is statistically significant, then the structural change may 
be attributed to changes in the slope factors.
If both the slope and intercept dummy variables are
statistically significant, then the original equation may be 
rewritten as two regressions:
First Period: Y* = («i + otE) + (|3i + <1e>X*, (S.6 )
Second Period: Y*. = X*.
The dummy variable model avoids several of the
difficulties encountered with the Chow test and the Brown- 
Durbin-Evans test. One regression may be used to test
several hypotheses: if slopes are equal, if intercepts are
equal, or if the entire regression is stable over time. It
tells not only if the two regressions are different but also
indicates the source of the difference. The dummy variable 
approach suffers in that it assumes the researcher knows a.
53
pr ior i the time period when the structural change takes 
place.
The dummy variable model as presented by Gujaradi may 
be extended to include several subgroups. In the model 
modified to accommodate more than two groups* however* the 
interpretation of the results is somewhat different. One 
period is chosen as a "base" and the estimated coefficients 
for the other periods are tested for significant difference 
from the base time period. For the purpose of this
analysis, the Reagan administration serves as the base time 
per iod.
S.3.3b Empirical Results of the Basic Dummy Variable Model 
Implementing the dummy variable approach is fairly 
straightforward. Within the context of the presidential 
popularity model, we estimate the following:
Y = oto + EfotDi + {lc*V-i +  Ejpil < D i . Y - i ) + T o H o n e y  + < 5 . 7 )
E?t *. < D t H o n e y  > + 0 o P 2 + E ' f G ^ D i P 2 ) + i o U *  +
E?®t(DiU2) + £ iKi 1 led + tfeWater + tf^Iran 
All variables are defined as in the initial model. The 
coefficients to be estimated in the model are a*., (I*, t s,*
, and Sx. Table S.3 presents the results of this
estimations technique applied to the presidential popularity 
function. We will reserve for future discussion the 
implications for each presidential regime of the estimates
5^
and examine only the question of structural change since 
this is our current focus.
Each of the “base" variables are statistically 
significant and of the expected sign. Since the Reagan 
period is used as the base for this analysis, ail base
coefficients refer to his regime. The t-statistic of each 
"differential" variable indicates whether the coefficient is 
statistically different from the corresponding "base" 
coefficient. Thus, the t-statistic of the Eisenhower dummy 
for inflation squared indicates that the public punished 
Eisenhower significantly more severely for increases in
inflation than it did Reagan. However, a significant dummy 
variable t-statistic does not imply that inflation, for 
example, plays a significant role in determining the 
popularity of the individual president. This is the case 
for the Carter administration: the inflation squared term
is significantly different from that for Reagan but results 
to be reported later indicate that this economic variable is 
not statistically significant with respect to its effect on 
Carter’s popularity.
As we examine the differential variables for the
intercept term, we see that Kennedy-Johnson and Carter
intercepts are significantly lower than Reagan’s and that 
the Eisenhower intercept is marginally lower. This is the 
case for the adjustment process as well. When examining the 
economic variables, we see that the inflationary effect is
55
significantly different from Reagan’s for Eisenhower and 
Carter while the unemployment variable is significantly 
different for Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford.
From this analysis* we conclude that when using Reagan 
as a base there has indeed been a structural break in the 
economic slope coefficients as well as in the intercept 
coefficients. Thus, estimating the popularity function over 
the entire period without including slope dummies as has 
been done in most previous research is improper.
The dummy variable approach to testing for structural 
change is not entirely satisfactory when applied to our 
presidential popularity model for several reasons. First, 
while the t-statistics of the dummy terms indicate if the 
differential term significantly differs from the base terms, 
they do not indicate if the variable has a significant 
impact on its relevant presidential administration.
Second, this approach allows us to test single 
hypotheses only. For example, we may test if the Eisenhower 
inflation term differs from Reagan’s or if that for Nixon- 
Ford differs from that for Reagan and we will make us of 
this pairwise test later. It will not, however, allow us to 
test the joint hypothesis that Eisenhower’s inflation term 
differs from Nixon-Ford’s which differs from Reagan’s. 
These joint tests are of importance to us and thus we turn 
to a sets of equations framework to implement them.
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2.4 Sets of Equations Model
The fourth test for stability follows loosely a
presentation by Judge) et. al. <198Q5 428-430) and is 
conceptually quite similar to the dummy variable model. We 
give it special attention because it addresses the two major
problems associated with the dummy variable approach: it
allows joint tests for stability rather than individual
tests only and it creates a t-statistic for the significance 
of each variable with respect to its specific 
administration. Section 2.4.1 describes the basic sets of 
equations model and Section 2.4.2 presents the empirical
results.
2.4.1 A Theoretical Discussion of the Sets of Equations
Model
To utilize the sets of equations model) the data is 
first partitioned into two subgroups) one pre-change and the 
other post-change. 1 0  Stacked vectors and a block matrix are 
then formed as follows:
y  i = X i  0 fll +
_ Y e _ 0  X s S e £  e
10For simplicity of presentation) we have limited 
ourselves to two subgroups) though the model can be expanded 
to include any number. In the empirical work to follow) for 
example) we use as many as seven subgroups) one for each 
presidential administration.
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y = X<3 + £ (S. 9)
y is a stacked vector of the dependent variable where y* 
refers to the first subgroup and ys to the second. X is a 
block matrix containing the regressors relevant to each 
subgroup. A pleasing feature of this model is that the 
regressors in Xi and X^ may include the same variables but 
they are by no means restricted to do so as with the Chow 
test. (3 is a vector containing the coefficients far the X 
matrix such that (3 ’ = C <3 i. a. (iie- . .(iikl where k is the number 
of regressors relevant to the subgroup; £* is the error term 
for the corresponding subgroup.
By applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to the above 
system* we obtain estimators for the stacked parameter 
vector (3:
— P _ -
b = b* — CXiX*) iy i
be ( X eX e )
Estimating the model in this sets of equations format 
allows us to obtain results equivalent to those obtained by 
estimating each subgroup individually. This is not entirely 
equivalent to estimating separate regressions for each 
subgroup* however. As Judge* et. al. <1908* 430) have 
pointed out* while two separate regressions would produce 
identical parameter estimates* two different estimates of
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the error variance would be generated rather than one as 
obtained from this model.
The major drawback to implementing the sets of 
equations model is that the researcher must make an a priori 
decision as to where the structural change occurs or come to 
such a conclusion in an ad hoc manner. The model provides 
no guidance for choosing the point(s) in time where the 
shift takes place as is the case with the Brown Durbin Evans 
test.
The sets of equations model is attractive, however, for 
a variety of reasons. First, it is extremely straightford 
to implement and easy to interpret. Second, as noted 
previously, the subgroups may include the same regressors, 
but they are not restricted to do so. This addresses the 
major drawback in using the Chow test. In addition, the 
inclusion of numerous dummy variables does not pose 
computational problems as with the Brown Durbin Evans test. 
Third, we may derive t-statistics for the significance of 
each coefficient to its specific administration, an 
improvement over the dummy variable model. Finally, a major 
benefit for our purposes is that by means of an F-test we 
may determine whether structural changes have occurred in 
the intercept term, the slope coefficients, or both.
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5.4.2 Empirical Results of the Sets of Equations Model
When applying the sets of equations model to an 
analysis of presidential popularity, we initially divide the 
data into seven groups, one for each of the administrations. 
The regressor matrix for each subgroup includes a constant, 
lagged dependent variable, inflation squared and 
unemployment squared. All administrations with the
exception of Johnson and Ford include a honeymoon variable. 
The honeymoon variable is excluded for these two 
administratons because preliminary research indicates that 
the honeymoon period for them was either extremely short or 
nonexistent. Additionally, the submatrix for Johnson
includes the Killed variable, that for Nixon includes the 
Watergate variable and that for Reagan includes the Iran 
variable. All variables are defined as in the preceding 
sect ions.
This sets of equations model is estimated by ordinary 
least squares. * 1 The results are presented in Table 2.4 
with t*-statistics in parentheses. The reported R® adjusted 
for degrees of freedom indicates that 92 percent of the 
variance in the residuals is accounted for by the model.
Table 2.4 also reports the Durbin m-statistic. Due to 
computational problems encountered when employing a lagged 
dependent variable in the block matrix format we chose not
**We employed Proc Matrix in SAS to generate the OLS 
results.
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to employ the Durbin h-test for serial correlation typically 
employed when a lagged dependent variable is used but rather 
we report the results of the Durbin m-test. The Durbin m- 
test consists of regressing the least squares residuals on 
all variables in the original regression in addition to the 
residual lagged one period and testing the significance of 
the estimated coefficient of €_i by a standard t-test. If 
the t-test indicates that €-3. is not significantly different 
from zero then we conclude that no serial correlation is 
present. For ease in presentation, we refer to the t-value 
of €-3. as the "m-stat ist ic . " 5 K Since this m-statistic is 
not statistically significant we are satisfied that there is 
no serial correlation in the residuals.
A discussion of the estimated coefficients will be 
reserved for Chapter 3. Currently* we use these estimates
to conduct a series of F-tests to determine whether the
estimation of the presidential popularity function should 
span the entire time period or each administration
separately. The results of the various tests are presented
in Table 2.5, Column 1. Test 1 tests the joint hypothesis 
that all common variables in the seven regimes are equal: 
that all intercepts are equal, that all adjustment processes
ieFor more information on the m-test see Kmenta (19B6). 
Maddala and Rao (1973) find no substantial differences
between the m-test and the h-test. Spencer (1975) presents
evidence in favor of the m-test. Due to the use of the
lagged residual* we drop the first value of each
administration when applying the m-test.
61
are equal, and that inflation terms across regimes and 
unemployment terms across regimes are equal. The calculated 
F-statistic is presented with degrees of freedom in 
parentheses beneath it. The F-statistic indicates that we 
may reject at the 99*/ confidence level the null hypothesis 
that all common values are equal.
The rejection of this joint null hypothesis could be 
caused by the rejection of any of the individual hypotheses 
comprising the joint hypothesis. If, for instance, the 
intercepts of each administration are not equal but all 
other common variables are equal, then the model implicit in 
most previous work which estimates the function over the 
entire time period and includes intercept dummy variables 
would be appropriate. If, however, the economic variables
are not equal then the slopes for the various regimes would 
be different and the sets of equations model presented here 
is appropriate. Thus, we undertake further tests for 
equality of variables across regimes.
Test S compares only the intercepts of each 
administration. The F-statistic indicates that we may 
reject the null hypothesis that the intercept values are 
equal. Test 3 conducts an F-test comparing the adjustment 
processes, the coefficients of Y_i, over the 
administrations. Again, the F-statistic allows us to reject 
the null hypothesis that the adjustment processes are equal.
Test h is a joint F-test with the null hypothesis that 
the inflation terms across regimes and unemployment terms 
across regimes are equal. Once more* the F-statistic causes 
us to reject the hypothesis that the slope variables across 
regimes are equal. We refine this hypothesis still further 
by examining the null hypothesis that the inflation terms 
are equal across administrations in Test 5 and that the 
unemployment terms across regimes are equal in Test 6. Bath 
of these tests allow us to reject the null hypothesis that 
the variables are equal. These results lead us to the 
conclusion that the economic impact on popularity varies 
from administration to administration and thus that the 
presidential popularity functions should be estimated either 
for each administration or jointly for the entire time 
period in a way which allows all the coefficients to vary. 
It is clear that just including regime dummies is not 
sat isfactory.
Chappell (19S3) estimates the popularity function for 
the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford administrations jointly. 
He argues that the economic policies followed by both 
Johnson and Ford differed only slightly from those initiated 
by their predecessors. In addition* the Ford administration 
is so short that it allows only a very limited number of 
degrees of freedom. Within the sets of equations model
estimated above and presented in Table E.^ tests of 
structural change between the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations and the Nixon and Ford administrations may 
be conducted. Upon examining Columns 2 of Table 2.5, the 
only test which may be rejected at the 95 percent confidence 
level for the Kennedy-Johnson administrations is Test h, 
that the unemployment terms across the two administrations 
are equal. This is not surprising given that the Johnson 
'jnemployment term is positive rather than negative and that 
it is statistically significant as well. Upon examining the 
results for the Nixon vs. Ford administrations in Column 3 
of Table 2.5, we see that the once more the only test which 
may be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level is Test 
6, that the unemployment terms are equal. Since in both 
cases the joint hypothesis that both economic variables are 
equal (Test 4) and the joint hypothesis that all common 
variables are equal (Test 1) cannot be rejected at the 95 
percent confidence level, we may conclude that estimating 
the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford administrations jointly 
rather than separately is acceptable.
2.4.3 Extensions of the Sets of Equations Model
The tests in the preceding paragraphs indicate that the 
Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford administrations may be 
estimated jointly because the evidence of structural change 
between them is weak. As such, we re-estimate our sets of 
equations model employing only five subgroups: one each for
Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, Nixon-Ford, Carter, and Reagan.
bu
The Eisenhower* Carter* and Reagan regressor sub-matrices 
include the variables as described above. The relevant 
regressor matrix for Kennedy-Johnson includes an intercept* 
lagged dependent variable, inflation and unemployment 
squared, honeymoon for the first year of the Kennedy 
administration, and the Killed variable. That for Nixon- 
Ford is similar but includes the Watergate binary dummy 
rather than the Killed variable. Table 2 .b provides the OLS 
results for this estimation in addition to the adjusted Ra 
and the Durbin m-statistic.
Table 2.7 gives the F-statistics for the tests for 
structural change applied to the sets of equations model 
which estimates the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford 
administrations jointly. Tests 1-6 are the same tests as 
reported in Table 2.S. Test 7, a test of the null 
hypothesis that the honeymoon effects are equal across 
regimes* was added because in this format each submatrix 
includes a honeymoon variable. The conclusions with respect 
to structural change remain the same whether we use seven 
administrations or whether we combine Kennedy-Johnson and 
Nixon-Ford and thereby have five subgroups. With the 
exception of the honeymoon effect, all variables are 
significantly different from administration to
administration.
2.S Summary of Chapter 2
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This chapter has presented several models for
structural change and, where possible* has applied these 
models to the presidential popularity function. Through the 
dummy variable model and sets of equations model we have 
shown that there has been a structural shift in both the 
slope and intercept coefficients over time. Thus,
estimating each administration in the sets of equations
format or in a manner which allows all coefficients to vary 
is superior to constraining all slope coefficients to be 
equal by simply estimating the function over the entire time 
per iod.
Since our analysis has shown that it is wise to examine 
presidential regimes individually, we take a mare detailed 
look at each administration in the following chapter. A few 
brief comments should be made at this juncture, however. 
First, while the quadratic model appears to work well for 
the Republican administrations, our success with the 
Democratic regimes is much more limited. Chapter 3 will
present alternate specifications of the Kennedy-Johnson and 
Carter administrations in hopes of finding a more 
satisfactory specification.
Second, the coefficients of unemployment and inflation 
as presented in the tables are initial effects only. The 
full impact of changes in the macro variables on popularity 
may be found only after all adjustments have been made <Y = 
Y-*). Chapter 3 will implement a nonlinear model which
makes direct estimates of the equilibrium values. Within 
this framework we will use intercept and slope dummies to 
make pairwise comparisons of the equilibrium values for the 
administrations which have significant macro coefficients> 
the Republican regimes.
Table 2.1
Maximum and Minimum Values -for the Presidencies
Eisenhower 




















79V. (Dec. 1956) 
3.84*/. (May 1957) 
7.6V. (June 1953)
80.5*/. (Apr. 1961) 
4.65Vi (Oct. 1968) 
7.1*/. (May 1961)
67*/. (March 1973) 
12.26*/. (Jan 1975) 
9.0*/. (June 1975)
68’/. (May 1981)
12.37% (Feb. 1981) 
10.8*/. (Dec. 1982, 
Jan. 1983)
Minimum
49*/. (Mar. 1958) 
-0.87*/. (July 1955) 
2-5*/. (Sept. 1958)
35*/, (Aug. 196B) 
0.67*/. (Jan. 1962) 
3.4*/. (Sep t-Nov. 1968)
24*/. (July, Aug. 1974) 
3.2'/, (June 1972) 
3.4*/. (Feb.-Jun. 1969)
36.7*/. (Jan. 1983) 
1.15% (Jan. 1987) 
6.1*/. (July 1987)
72.3*/. (Mar. 1977) 27*/. (July 1980)
14.67*/. (Mar. 1980) 6.25'/. (Feb. 1978)
7.8*/. (July 1980) 5.6*/. (May 1979)
6B
TABLE 2.2
Presidential Popularity Function Estimates 
March 1953 to November 19BQ 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Coefficient Estimate (t-statistic)
Constant 21.7S ( 8.68)
0.71 (23.93)
Honey 0.53 ( 5.06)
pe -0.03 (-3.48)


















Dummy Variable Model 















































































Adjusted R®2 - 0.91
Durbin m-statistic = 1.S7
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Table 2.4
Estimates -for Sets of Equations Model 
March 1953-November 198B 
All Administrations Estimated Separately
Coefficient Estimate (t-statistic)





Kennedy Intercept 10.02 (0.99)
Y_! 0.88 <8.27)
Honey 0.46 <0.83)pis -0. 12 < -0. 10)
IF -0.06 < —0.26)
Johnson Intercept 12.96 <2.63)
Y_ i 0.60 <6.17)
pe -0.11 <-0.73)
IF 0.61 < 3.05)
Ki1 led -0.003 t  <-1.90





Water -10.78 <-5 .70)




Carter Intercept 16.49 <3.64)
Y_t 0.70 <10.28)
Honey 0.88 <2.58)p e -0.01 <-1.20)
ya -0.07 <-1.00)
Reagan Intercept 49.84 <6.30)
Y-* 0.37 <3.76)
Honey 1 .01 <3.31)
pe -0.07 <-3.35)
LF -0.22 <-5.50)
Iran -10.11 <-5 .45)
Adjusted Rs = 0.92 Durbin's m-statistic = 1.21
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Table 2.5 















Test 2 3 .8 17B**














Test 4 3.4546** 2.4-667




















♦ Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95'/. 
confidence level with the degrees of freedom indicated in 
the parentheses below the f-statistic value.




Estimates for "Sets of Equations" Model 
March 1953-November 19SS 
Kennedy-Johnson & Nixon-Ford Estimated Jointly









































Y — i 0.37 (3.54)




Adjusted FF = 0.91
Durbin m-statistic = 1.23
73
Table 2.7 








Intercepts Equal (A, 366)
Test 3 5.1AA2**
Lagged Depend. (A, 366)
Variables Equal
Test A 3.167A**
Inflation and <8, 366)
Unemp. Terms Equal
Test 5 2.9679*
Inflation Terms (A, 366)
Equal
Test 6 3.1319*





♦ Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95*/* 
confidence level with the degrees of freedom indicated in 
the parentheses below the f-statistic value.




















Figure 2.3 Nixon-Ford Popularity
f0tULA




















An Analysis of the Presidential Regimes
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter established that the presidential 
popularity function should be estimated in a manner which 
allows the coefficients to vary for each administration or 
regime. This chapter examines each regime in turn: the
Eisenhower, the Kennedy-Johnson, the Nixon-Ford, the Carter, 
and the Reagan administrations. The section for each regime 
includes a sensitivity analysis and where applicable a 
discussion of the equilibrium values and an analysis of the 
social preference curves for the administrations. The final 
section of the chapter presents comparisons of the 
administrations.
3.2 The Eisenhower Administration
3.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The sets of equations estimates for the Eisenhower 
administration may be reproduced using OLS for the 
Eisenhower years only. This analysis is beneficial in that 
it allows us to report an adjusted RE and a Durbin h- 
statistic for this individual administration and thus gives 
a better indication of fit for the regime. The model we 
estimate for the Eisenhower administration is as follows:




Column 1 of Table 3.1 presents the results of this basic 
model. Note that while the coefficient estimates are equal 
to those generated by the sets of equations model, the t- 
statistics are slightly different,1
With the exception of the honeymoon variable, all the 
estimated coefficients are significant and of the
anticipated sign. The Durbin h-statistic is not significant 
at the 95'/. confidence level so there is no evidence of 
serial correlation in the residuals. The partial adjustment 
process is given by one minus the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, Thus, approximately 40'/. of the
effect of a change in inflation or unemployment is reflected 
in popularity in the first month and 77 percent of the 
adjustment is completed after three months.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the 15-month 
honeymoon trend variable is the only insignificant
Estimating the model in the sets of equations format 
as presented in Chapter £ is not altogether equivalent to 
estimating separate regressions for the five presidential 
regimes. Five completely separate regressions produce five 
estimates of the error variance tre. A "pooled" estimate of 
ae for the sets of equations model may be calculated from 
the five a** values generated through separate regression 
analysis but this estimate is not equal to any of the 
individual least squares estimates. Because the error 
variances produced by the sets of equations model and 
running separate regressions differ, the t-values, and Re 
values will differ as well. When comparing the t-statistics 
of the two models, however, only the Carter honeymoon 
coefficient changes in significance. Thus, we see no real 
problem in switching from the sets of equations model to 
estimating the regimes individually.
81
coefficient in the model. This leads us to explore other 
formulations of the variable which may more accurately 
capture the early term effect. Column S of Table 3.1 
employs a shorter version of the same variable) a 6-month 
rather than a 13-month declining trend. A 13-month binary 
variable is utilized in the regression presented in Column 
3. In both cases* the honeymoon variable continues to be 
■significant. The values of the other coefficients remain 
fairly constant across the regressions as do the values of 
the adjusted Re and the log of the likelihood function. 
Column 4- of this table presents the values of the regression 
coefficients when the honeymoon variable is excluded 
altogether. Because the honeymoon variable is significant 
for other administrations and because its inclusion does not 
greatly alter the values of the inflation and unemployment 
coefficients* we continue to include the 13-month declining 
trend to be consistent across regimes.
3.3.3 The Social Preference Curves
The full impact of the effects of inflation and 
unemployment on popularity are seen only after all 
adjustment processes have been made. Equilibrium values 
which exist after all adjustments to changes in inflation 
and unemployment are complete may be found by setting Y =
Y_a. in the original regression equation presented in Column
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1 of Table 3.1. For the Eisenhower administration this 
process yields:
Y = 74.31 + 0.22Honey - 0 . 7 3 ^  - 0.30LP- (3.2)
The effect of changes in P or U on Eisenhower’s 
popularity may be found by calculating the partial 
derivatives dY/dP = -1.437P and dY/dU = -0.595U. Two points 
of interest may be seen from these partial derivatives. 
First, Eisenhower was punished far more for increases in 
inflation than he was for equal increases in unemployment. 
Second, the effect on popularity of an increase in P or U 
increases greatly as the two variables increase. For 
example, an increase in inflation from 2Y, to 3% would
decrease Eisenhower’s popularity by 2.B7 percentage points
while an increase from 5 to 6 percent would cause popularity 
to decline by 7.IB points.
From equation 3.2 it is possible to draw equilibrium 
indifference curves for the Eisenhower administration. The 
honeymoon variable is set to zero, implying a period after
the initial 12 months, and inflation is solved for in terms
of unemployment at a constant popularity level. Figure 3.1 
graphs these curves with popularity levels ranging from 50*/. 
to 70%. In addition, Figure 3.1 includes the time path 
followed by inflation and unemployment over the Eisenhower 
years.
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The marginal rate of substitution between rates of 
inflation and unemployment consistent with a given level of 
presidential popularity is given by
dP/dU = -<<WfSs)U/P (3.3)
Substituting the estimated values of and in (3.3)
gives dP/dU = -0.53&U/P. Table 3.3 gives a grid of values 
for dP/dU over the relevant ranges of inflation and 
unemployment for the Eisenhower administration. At
relatively high rates of inflation (the A*/, and 3% inflation 
columns), with few exceptions dP/dU is absolutely less than 
one. This means that to keep popularity constant the 
increase (decrease) in the inflation rate is less than the 
corresponding decrease (increase) in the unemployment rate. 
With few exceptions, dP/dU is absolutely greater than one at 
low inflation rates indicating that an increase (decrease) 
in inflation must be accompanied by a larger decrease 
(increase) in unemployment to maintain a constant popularity 
rating. A second point of interest which may be seen from 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 is that at relatively high rates of 
inflation (and relatively low unemployment rates) the social 
indifference curves become very flat.
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3.3 The Kennedy-Johnson Administration
Following the procedure outlined for the Eisenhower 
administration* we estimate the following equation by OLS 
for the Kennedy-Johnson administration:
Y = j3o + fliY- 1  + + ftaLF + (^Killed + fl«Honey + £ (3.4)
Table 3.3* Column 1 provides the results with t-statistics 
in parentheses* adjusted R13* Durbin h-statistic, standard 
error of the regression and the log of the likelihood 
function. As with the Eisenhower administration* the 
estimated coefficients are equal to those produced in the 
sets of equations model* though the t-statistics differ 
siightly.
Upon examining these results* we see that the 
unemployment term is incorrectly signed and both economic 
variables are statistically insignificant as are the 
honeymoon and Killed variables. Columns 2 and 3 of Table
3.3 present results of eliminating first the inflation 
squared and then the unemployment squared term. In both 
cases, however, the remaining macroeconomic coefficient 
continues to be insignificant and the coefficient of the 
unemployment term in Column 3 remains positive. Column 4 
presents results of a regression employing inflation and 
unemployment linearly and again the macroeconomic effects 
are insignificant.
as
Though the insignificance of the macroeconomic 
coefficients is troublesome* other researchers employing 
different models have had similar difficulties with the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Norpoth and Yantek 
<1983) found that within an ARIMA model the lags of 
unemployment and inflation were either insignificant or of 
the wrong sign for Johnson. Kernell (1978) found inflation 
and unemployment to be insignificant for both Kennedy and 
Johnson.
As with the Eisenhower administration, the honeymoon 
variable is insignificant for the Kennedy-Johnson 
administration. Columns 1-3 of Table 3.A present alternate 
specifications of this variable. These results may be 
compared with the basic model in Column 1 of Table 3.3. The 
honeymoon variable in Column 1 of Table 3.A is a six-month 
trend variable for Kennedy and that in Column 2 is a 12- 
month binary honeymoon variable. Both of these formulations 
assume no honeymoon period for Johnson. The honeymoon 
variable in Column 3 is a 12-month declining trend for the 
Kennedy administration and a 6-month declining trend for 
Johnson, thus assuming that the honeymoon period was shorter 
for Johnson than for Kennedy. All three formulations are 
statistically insignificant and do not increase the portion 
of error variance accounted for by the equation and thus do 
not improve upon the basic specification presented in Column 
1, Tab1e 3.3.
B6
The Killed variable employed thus Tar has been the 
number of U.S. casualties in each month of involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict. It is marginally significant in 
several of the regressions. It has been argued that this
measure does not adequately measure the growing discontent 
over U.S. involvement in the region and that cumulative 
battle deaths would be a more satisfactory measure. Column 
4 of Table 3.4 presents results of an analysis using 
cumulative battle deaths. Since it is statistically 
insignificant, however, it is deemed inferior to the initial 
measure.
It might be argued that a dummy variable for the
Johnson administration would be appropriate to account for 
personality factors influencing the two regimes. The series 
of F-tests presented in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2 indicates 
that there is no significant difference between the two
intercept terms, however, and so we do not include this 
intercept dummy.
3.A The Nixon-Ford Administration
3.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The basic model estimated for the Nixon-Ford
administration is
Y = ^ o + fliY —n + /I ePe + (IJJ* + (J^Water + fltsHoney + £ (3.5)
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The OLS results) equivalent to those found in the sets of 
equations format) are presented in Column 1 of Table 3.5 
along with the adjusted R^, Durbin h-statistic, standard 
error of the regression and log of the likelihood function. 
With the exception of the honeymoon coefficient* all 
coefficients are statistically significant. The Durbin h- 
statistic indicates that serially correlated errors are not 
a problem for this regime. The adjustment process is given 
by ( 1 “(3 j,) and indicates that in the first month 577. of the 
adjustment to changes in inflation and unemployment is 
complete.
The Watergate variable* Water* employed in this
analysis takes the value of 1 for the period 1973:4-1974:7* 
a value of .5 for August* 1974* and 0 otherwise. This 
measure varies somewhat from that chosen by other
researchers to represent the effect of Watergate on Nixon’s 
popularity. Chappell (1983) and Chappell and Keech (19B5ab) 
employ a shorter binary variable, beginning the variable 
with 1973:4* corresponding to the "Saturday Night Massacre*" 
and ending with 1974:2 on a quarterly basis. Column 2 of 
Table 3.5 presents the results of employing this variable,
Short Water Binary, on a monthly basis. Frey and Schneider
(1978) utilize a trend variable taking the values 1,3*5*5,5 
for the quarterly period 1973:2-1974:2. Column 3 of Table
8B
3.5 gives the regression values when a similar variable* 
Trend Mater* is employed on a monthly basis.*2
When comparing the results of the three formulations of 
the Watergate variable, we see that the original 
specification presented in Column 1 is superior to the other 
specifications for several reasons. First, it yields the 
highest adjusted R3, indicating that a larger portion of 
error variance is accounted for in this equation. Second, 
the coefficient of this Watergate variable is the most 
highly significant. Finally, the standard error of the 
regression is lowest for this specification.
We may test for the superiority of the original 
formulation over the alternative formulations through a 
series of pairwise tests.3 The popularity function is 
estimated including all regressors in the basic model. One 
of the alternative dummy specifications is added in turn. 
If the additional Watergate dummy is insignificant, the 
original formulation is deemed superior. If both are 
significant then each measure adds information and should be 
included. In this case, models using just one measure are 
rejected. The t-statistic for Short Water Binary is -1.43 
and for Trend Water is -1.82. Thus, we conclude that our 
original formulation is better than the two alternatives.
^The variable is followed as follows: a value of 1 for
1973:4-1973:6, 3 for 1973:7-1973:9, and 5 for 1973:10-1974:7.
3See Davidson and MacKinnon <1981) for more 
information.
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Just as with the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Jahnson 
administrations, the coefficient of the honeymoon variable 
is insignificant for the Nixon-Ford regime. Columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.6 present the alternative formulations of the 
variable examined for both of the preceding administrations. 
The adjusted Rs for these three is equal to that of the 
original model, presented in Column 1 of Table 3.5. In 
addition, neither of them are statistically significant. 
Column 4 of Table 3.6 presents the regression results when 
the honeymoon variable is excluded altogether. The slope 
and intercept values do not differ greatly from those of the 
original model which includes the honeymoon variable and 
thus our calculations of the social indifference curves to 
follow will be based upon the original model in order to be 
consistent.
3.^.5 The Nixon-Ford Social Preference Curves
By setting Y = Y-t in Column 1 of Table 3.5 it is 
possible to find the impact on popularity of inflation and 
unemployment after full adjustments have been made. This 
process yields
Y = 63.04 - O.OTP68 - 0.19U® - £3.93Water (3.6)
+ O.l^Honey
The partial derivatives dY/dP = -.137P and dY/dLJ =
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-0.3Q7U give the effect of changes in P or U on the Nixon- 
Ford admirtistration’s popularity. As was noted for the 
Eisenhower administration, the effect on popularity of an 
increase in either macro variable increases greatly as the 
two variables increase. As compared with the Eisenhower 
administration, it appears that Nixon-Ford was punished 
slightly less for increases in either variable than was 
Eisenhower.
Figure 3.2 gives the social indifference curves for the 
Nixon-Ford administration with popularity levels ranging 
from 38'/. to 62*/.. These curves are derived by setting Water 
= Honey = 0 in Equation 3.6 and solving for P in terms of U 
at a constant popularity rating.
Also included in Figure 3.2 is the time path of 
inflation and unemployment during the Nixon-Ford years. 
Though the time path of inflation and unemployment during 
the early sixties followed the pattern predicted by Phillips 
curve behavior, this time path indicates the deviations from 
that pattern which caused economists to consider shifts in 
the Phillips curve relationship. The large fluctuations in 
inflation with nonexistent or relatively small changes in 
unemployment in the opposite direction are indicative of the 
stagflation caused by oil supply shocks during the period. 
As inflation rose with unemployment held fairly constant or 
increasing slightly, popularity decreased dramatically.
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Later* as both inflation and unemployment fell approval 
ratings improved as well.
The slope of the indifference curve* or the marginal 
rate of substitution* is found by solving for dP/dU and 
yields -S.71U/P. Table 3.7 presents a table of values for 
dP/dU over the range of inflation and unemployment rates 
experienced during the regime. In all cases the values are 
less than 1 in absolute terms. This implies that an 
increase (decrease) in the inflation must be accompanied by 
a larger decrease (increase) in unemployment in order to 
maintain a constant popularity rating.
3.5 The Carter Administration
As with the preceding administrations* we estimate the 
following equation by OLS for the Carter administration:
Y = do + + (leP^ + + fl-cHoney + G (3.7)
The estimated coefficients, presented in Column 1 of Table 
3.B, are equivalent to those found via the sets of equations 
model, but as with the other administrations, the t- 
statistics differ slightly. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses beneath the coefficient and the adjusted Ra * 
Durbin h-statistic, standard error of the regression, and 
the log of the likelihood function are also reported.
9£
Both of the economic terms in the basic model (Column 
1, Table 3.8) are of the expected sign but are statistically 
insignificant. The adjustment process (given by )
indicates that 30% of the adjustment to changes in inflation 
and unemployment occurs within the first month. Within this 
analysis, the honeymoon variable is marginally significant.
The Durbin h-statistic unfortunately exceeds the 
critical value and thus we must conclude that the errors of 
the model are serially correlated. Since the presence of 
serially correlated errors causes the t-statistics to be 
biased upward, however, correction for the problem would not 
cause the insignificant macroeconomic coefficients to be 
significant.
As with the Kennedy-Johnson regime, we examine the 
effect of alternately dropping the unemployment squared term 
and then the inflation squared term. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Columns £ and 3 respectively of 
Table 3.8. In both cases, the remaining economic variable 
continues to be insignificant and the Durbin h-statistic 
still indicates the presence of serially correlated errors. 
Column 4 of the table presents an analysis which includes 
inflation and unemployment linearly, but the macroeconomic 
coefficients remain insignificant and the serially 
correlated errors persist. The adjusted R e terms for each 
regression remain fairly high, due in large part to the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
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Continuing with the sensitivity analysis, we explore 
the various formulations of the honeymoon variable examined 
for the preceding administrations in Table 3.9. The 
honeymoon variable employed in the original model (Column 1, 
Table 3.8) is a 12-month declining trend variable. Column 1 
of Table 3.9 includes a 6-month declining trend variable 
while Column 2 employs a 12-month binary honeymoon dummy. 
Neither of these measures change the basic conclusions found 
in the original model. Since both honeymoon variables are 
statistically insignificant, since the macroeconomic 
variables in each equation remain insignificant, and since 
serially correlated errors are present, these formulations 
are not an improvement over the original specification.
3.6 The Reagan Administration
3.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Turning to the Reagan administration, the basic model 
estimated for this regime is
Y = fto + ftiY-i + ftePE + ftsiU*3 + ft<*Iran + fttsHoney £ (3.8)
Column 1 of Table 3.10 gives the results of this estimation, 
again with t-statistics in parentheses. All of the 
coefficients have the anticipated sign and are statistically 
significant with t-statistics greater than four in absolute
9^
terms. In addition* the Durbin h-statistic indicates that 
the error terms are not serially correlated.
Although the 12-month declining trend honeymoon 
variable is statistically significant for the Reagan years* 
in keeping with the previous sections we examine other 
formulations of the variable. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.10 
present the results of employing first a 6-month declining 
trend honeymoon and then a 12-month binary honeymoon. There 
is little difference between the results presented in 
Columns 1 and 2, but the serial correlation present when 
using the binary dummy in Column 3 make this alternative 
unattractive.
The Iran variable chosen for the sets of equations 
model and presented in Column 1 of Table 3.10 is a binary 
variable beginning with December 1986 and extending to the 
end of the administration. While it is a simple matter to 
pinpoint the month the public first knew of the affair* it 
is difficult to determine a priori how long and in what 
manner the scandal impacted his popularity. Table 3.11 
presents several alternative measures of the Iran-Contra 
affair. Iran 2 is a binary dummy beginning with December 
1986 and continuing until August 1987* the last month of 
popularity figures before a data gap of three months. 
Assuming that the impact of the event lessened over time* 
Iran 3 takes the value of 1 for 1986:12-1987:8 and fallowing 
the data gap takes the value of 0.9 in 1988:1 declining to
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0.1 in 1900:9 and takes the value of 0 otherwise. Iran 4 is 
a shorter version of the previous variable, taking the value 
of 0.** in 198B:1 declining to 0.1 in 1908:4. Finally, the 
fourth column of Table 3.11 employs two Iran dummy 
variables, the first taking the value of 1 for 1986:12- 
1987:IS and 0 otherwise and the second taking the value of 1 
for the time period after the data gap, 1988:1-1988:11, and 
0 otherwise.
The test used to determine superiority of Watergate 
variables for the Nixon-Ford regime may be applied to the 
Iran-Contra variable as well. The popularity function is 
estimated including all regressors in the basic model and 
the alternative dummies are added in turn. The t-statistic 
for Iran 2 is -1.18, that for Iran 3 is -2.06, and for Iran 
4 the value is -1.34. This indicates that our original 
formulation is better than Iran 2 and Iran 4 and is at least 
as good as Iran 3.
A comparison of the results in Table 3.11 with the 
basic model presented in Column 1 of Table 3.10 indicates 
that the t-statistic of the Iran coefficient for the basic 
model is larger in absolute terms than that for either of 
the other models. In addition, the log of the likelihood 
function is larger in absolute terms than that of either 
Column 1, 2, or 3 of Table 2 and the adjusted Re is larger 
as well. Column 4 indicates that the binary variable pre­
data gap and post-data gap are both significant and thus
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gives further evidence that the Iran variable in the basic 
model is appropriate.
3.6.S Social Preference Functions for the Reagan
Administration
After all adjustment processes have taken place 
(setting Y = Y-j. ) * the equilibrium values for the Reagan 
Administration can be seen as follows:
Y = 79.66 + 1.61Honey - 0.11P12 - 0.35Ue (3.9)
- 16.15Iran
As with the other Republican administrations* we find 
the effects of changes in inflation and unemployment on 
Reagan’s popularity by taking the partial derivatives. 
These values are dY/dP = -0.S1SP and dY/dU = -0.69AU-
Figure 3.3 depicts equilibrium indifference curves for 
popularity ratings ranging from 3V/. to 70*/,. The curves have 
been drawn assuming that Honey = Iran = 0; that is* the time 
period after the honeymoon period is over and before the 
Iran-Contra affair.
The marginal rate of substitution between inflation and 
unemployment consistent with a given level of popularity may 
be calculated as dP/dU = -3.18E U/P. Table 3.IE gives a 
grid of values for dP/dU for the inflation and unemployment
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rates relevant to the Reagan years. Note first that for all 
tabulated values* dP/dU is absolutely greater than one. 
This means that to keep popularity constant the increase 
(decrease) in the inflation rate is always greater than the 
corresponding decrease (increase) in the unemployment rate. 
Note also that the indifference curves become very steep for 
relatively low rates of inflation.
Figure 3.3 also shows the actual path taken by
inflation and unemployment. The pattern is that predicted 
by standard dynamic macroeconomic models in response to a 
deflationary shock when it is assumed that inflation 
expectations adjust adaptively. Unemployment rose as 
inflation fell and then unemployment fell as a new more or 
less steady law rate of inflation was maintained.'* Reagan’s 
popularity first fell as the effect of the increase in 
unemployment had more effect than the decline in inflation. 
Then* as unemployment fell with inflation relatively low, 
popularity rose markedly.
3.7 A Comparison of Republican Administrations
The previous sections have examined the presidential 
popularity functions and social preference curves for each 
administration. This section will make some comparisons
''The low rates of inflation in 19B6 and early 19B7 
reflect falls in energy prices. The annual energy inflation 
rates for 19B4 and 19B5 were 1.07. and 0.7V, respectively. 
The annual rate for 1986 decreased dramatically to -13.8*/. 
and increased to 0.57. in 1987.
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among the various regimes. The preceding analysis has shown 
that the macroeconomic variables for the Democratic regimes 
are statistically insignificant. A complete explanation of 
this finding is a topic for future research. At the moment) 
we focus upon the Republican terms only.
3.7.1 Social Preference Functions
Figure 3.4 presents the social preference functions for 
the three Republican administrations at a 50*/. popularity
rating. Note that the slopes and positions of the curves 
are quite different. The slope of the Eisenhower curve>-
0.536U/P) is much flatter than the slopes for Nixon-Ford and 
Reagan> -2.71U/P and -3.18U/P respectively.“ Though it is 
difficult to make definitive statements regarding the cause 
of the differences in slopes and positions) we may make some 
general comments.
The Reagan 50*/. indifference curve is farthest from the 
origin) indicating that he was allowed to have higher 
inflation and unemployment rates and yet maintain the same 
popularity level as the other two administrations. If 
Reagan is considered inherently more popular than his
Republican predecessors this would be expected. This is the 
interpretation most commonly assumed. Using this argument) 
the Nixon-Ford curve lies above the Eisenhower curve at
''These slopes were derived in sections 3.2.2) 3.4.2) 
and 3.£.2.
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almost all points because Nixon-Ford was inherently more 
popular for given levels of inflation and unemployment than 
was Eisenhower, an assertion open to much debate.
A second explanation for the large rightward shifts in 
the curves from Eisenhower to Reagan is that the public has 
gradually become more accustomed to higher rates of 
inflation and unemployment through the years. Inflation 
rates which seemed excessively high for the Eisenhower 
years, for example, may be deemed moderate in the Reagan 
eighties.
The 50*/. popularity rating is extremely low for the 
Republican administrations. Eisenhower’s popularity only 
once fell below this level. Figure 3.5 presents the 
indifference curves for the three regimes at the average 
popularity rating for the presidencies, 55*/.. The Reagan
curve remains farther to the right than the other two. As
we compare the relative positions of the three curves, 
however, it appears that the Nixon-Ford curve has shifted 
inward far more than the others from 50'/. to 55*/..
Figure 3.6 presents the indifference curves at a 62/. 
popularity rating, a level more typical for Eisenhower and 
Reagan. The most striking feature of this graph in 
comparison with Figures 3.4 and 3.5 is that the Nixon-Ford 
curve lies everywhere beneath the equivalent curve for
Eisenhower. Neither of the hypotheses presented for the
differences in the positions of the curves can explain the
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change in the ordering of the Eisenhower and Nixon-Ford 
curves from Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.6.
3.7.3 Equilibrium Values
A second method of examining differences between the 
three Republican administrations is by analyzing the 
equilibrium values of the popularity functions for each 
regime. We make use of a method employed in Smyth, 
Washburn* and Dua (1989a) modified by the dummy variable 
technique presented in Chapter 3 to account for two or more 
regimes. In order to test the stability of the equilibrium 
coefficients between the Eisenhower and Nixon-Ford 
administrations* we estimate the following model using 
monthly data from 1953:3-1960:13, 1969:3-197616^:
Y = Ctf + c(N*<T): Coto + flo<N> + otiPs + Qx (N^P0 > <3.10)
+ asLF + (̂ (N-k-LF2)! + (XsHoney + (3a (N*Honey > + (l^Water 
+ Cl - £ - cCNa-tfJlY-i 
where <S* c» «i * and (S*. are the coefficients to be estimated, 
N is a dummy variable for the Nixon-Ford administration, and 
all other variables are defined above. This technique
allows the adjustment process, <T, to be estimated directly 
and the estimated coefficients of the social preference 
function are their equilibrium values. The model is
*Gap5 in the data exist as described in Chapter 3.
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estimated nanlinearly and the results are given in Table 
3.13.
The <x terms may be interpreted as the actual 
equilibrium coefficients for the Eisenhower administration 
and the (2 coefficients represent the differential between 
the Eisenhower value and the actual Nixon-Ford value. Thus, 
the t-statistics associated with the (3 terms reflect whether 
the |3 coefficient is statistically different from the 
corresponding <x coefficient. The c coefficient is the 
Nixon-Ford differential for the lagged adjustment process S.
Since the Nixon-Ford intercept dummy is statistically 
significant, we infer that "personality factors" did play a 
role in our assessment of the two regimes. Since the 
inflation differential is significant, then inflationary 
perceptions appear to have changed over time, with the 
public becoming more accoustomed to higher rates of 
inflation. The insignificant unemployment differential 
indicates that similar changes in unemployment preferences 
did not occur during the time period.
Qur interpretation of the significance (or 
insignificance) of the Nixon-Ford inflation and unemployment 
dummy variables is dependent upon the extent to which we 
assume "personality" forces also affect those coefficients. 
If we assume that all "personality" influences are accounted 
for in the intercept and intercept differential, then the 
assertions made in the preceding paragraph are valid. If,
lOH
however, the public is not able to disentangle perceptions 
regarding the president "as a man" from economic 
perceptions, then the interpretation in the preceding 
paragraph may be distorted. The significant change in views 
toward inflation might be accounted for as much by positive 
(or negative) attitudes toward the man himself as by any 
real changes in inflationary perceptions.
A similar comparison of equilibrium values may be made 
for the Nixon-Ford and Reagan administrations by estimating 
the following model:
Y = 16 + c (N*t?) 3 Coto + <3o<N> + (XiF3 + <N*FME) (3.11)
+ Oelf3 + (3a (N*LP)3 + a3Honey + |33 (N*Honey > +
o(i,Iran + (I*, (N*Water ) + C 1 — £ — c (N-frtf) 3 Y — ,.
The model is estimated using monthly data for 1969:2- 
1976:6, 1981:2-1988:12.-'' The « s, terms are the Reagan base 
terms, the (3* coefficients are the Nixon-Ford differential 
terms, £ is the Reagan adjustment coefficient and c is the 
Nixon-Ford differential. Table 3.1A presents the empirical 
results.
The t-statistic of the Nixon-Ford intercept 
differential indicates that Reagan was a substantially more 
popular president. There was no significant difference in 
adjustment processes as evidenced by the insignificant c
'’Gaps in the data exist as described in Chapter 2.
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(adjustment differential) coefficient. The t-statistics of 
(1 * and (1̂ , the Nixon-Ford inflation and unemployment 
differential coefficients* indicate that while inflationary 
perceptions remained constant over the time period, the 
public’s perceptions toward unemployment changed such that 
Reagan was punished (rewarded) significantly more for 
increases (decreases) in unemployment than was Nixon-Ford. 
These results should, of course, be taken with the same 
reservations as expressed with respect to the Eisenhower- 
Nixon-Ford equilibrium value analysis.
3.3 Summary
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of each 
presidential administration, presenting a sensitivity 
analysis when alternative specifications of the dummy 
variables are used. For the Republican administrations, the 
chapter includes a discussion of the social preference 
curves and their slopes. Despite efforts at achieving 
significant results for the Democratic administrations, the 
’’best" models do not explain popularity well. The 
insignificance of the Democratic macroeconomic variables and 
a lack of a complete explanation for this finding are 
perhaps the most perplexing aspects of the chapter.
When comparing Republican administrations, this chapter 
has shown that there are indeed differences in slopes and 
intercept terms of the social preference functions. Thus,
each Republican regime should be estimated in a manner which 
allows the coefficients to vary. It is quite difficult, 
however, to establish a complete explanation for the causes 
of the shifts over time as such shifts may reflect either 
differences associated with the personalities of the
presidents as perceived by the public or with changing 
attitudes with respect to inflation and unemployment.
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Table 3.1
Estimates for the Eisenhower Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Intercept £9.06 £8.45 31.43
(4.56) (4.54) (4.77)
Y_! 0.61 0.6E 0.59
(7.46) (7.60) (7.09)
PE —0.£8 -O.EB -0.31
(-3.14) (-3.13) (-3.37)








Adjusted 0.75 0.75 0.75
Durbin’s h 0.E90 0.010 0.533


















dP/dLI Tor Alternate 
Eisenhower
P\ u ev. 7V. 6V,
\
4 V. 01 -0.94 -0.80
3V. -1 .42 IDru•t -1 .07
2V. I ru * -1 .88 -1.61
IV. -4.29 -3.75 -3.22
Combinations of P and U 
Administrat ion
5 V. 4 V. 3 V. BY,
-0.67 -0.54 -0.40 t"OJ■01
-0.89 -0.71 -0.54 -0.36
-1 .34 -1 .07 1 O CD m -0.54
















for the Kennedy-Johnson Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
10.90 11.54 9.36 9.81
(S.53) (2.74) (2.89) (1.43)
0.78 0.82 0.80 0.77
(11.70) (13.87) (13.04) (11.23)
0.08 0.39 0.04 0.15









1 . 17 
(1.14)
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
-0.050 -1.022 -1.024 -0.858






Estimates for the Kennedy-Johnson Administration 
Alternate Specifications of "Honey" and "Killed" 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Intercept 10.80 11.28 11.41 B,
(2.61) (2.60) (2.65) (2
Y-i 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.
(11.B3) (11.86) (11.89) (l:
-0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.
(-0.57) (-0.63) (-0.66) (-0
LF 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.
(1.82) (1.17) (1.22) C
Killed—  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002












Adjusted Re 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.
Durbin's h -0.957 -0.966 -0.949 -1.





















Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration 


































































Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration 













































































dP/dU for Alternate Combinations of P and U 
Nixon-Ford Administration
p\ u 9*/. 8*/. 7*/. 6'/. 5*/. 4*/. 3*/.
\
12*/. -a. 03 -1 .81 -1 .58 -1 .36 -1 . 13 -0.90 -0. 68
11*/. -a. ae -1 .97 -1 .7E -1 .48 -1 .83 -0.99 -0.74
10*/. -a. 44 -E. 17 -1 .90 -1 .63 -1 .36 -1 .08 -0.81
9’/. -a.7i -a.41 -a. 11 -1 .81 -1 .51 -1 .80 -0.90
8*/, -3.05 -a. 7i -E. 37 -a. 03 -1 .69 -1 .36 -1 .08
7*/. -3.48 -3.10 -a. 71 -a. 38 -1 .94 -1 .55 -1 . 16
6*/. -4.07 -3.61 -3.16 -a.7i -8.86 -1 .81 -1 .36
5*/. -4.88 -4.34 -3.79 -3. as -8.71 -3.79 -1 .63
4*/. -6 .10 -5.4E -4.74 -4.07 -3.39 -8.71 -a. 03
3*/. -8.13 -7.83 -6.33 -5.48 -4.58 -3.61 -a.7i
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Table 3.B
Estimates for the Carter Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Intercept 16.49 13.71 15.14
(3.44) (5.59) (5.32)
Y_! 0.70 0.71 0.73
(6.89) (7.06) <7.59
































Estimates -For the Carter Administration 














Durbin’s h 1.889 2.286




Tab le 3.10 
Estimates for the Reagan Administration 




























































Estimates for the Reagan Administration 
Alternate Specifications of "Iran"
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Intercept 20. 1A 31.B8 22.28 AS.
( A .97) (6.83) (5.35) (8
Y-o. 0.72 0.58 0.69 0.
(12.33) (9.1A ) (11.71) (5
PH -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0,
(-2.8B) (-9.1A > (-3.03) (-A
LF -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 -0.
(-3.2A) (-5.37) (-3.67) (-6
Honey 0.89 0.99 0.91 1.











Adjusted R® 0.8A 0.87 0.85 0.
Durbin’s h 0.176 0.339 0.058 1,
























dP/dU for Alternate Combinations of P and U 
Reagan Administration
DXCL 117. 107. 97. 87. 77. 67.
13*/. -2.69 -2.45 -2.20 -1 .96 -1 .71 -1 .47
12*/. -2.92 -2.65 -2.39 -2. 12 -1 .86 -1 .59
11*/. -3. 18 -2.89 -2.60 -2.31 -2.02 -1 .74
10*/. -3.50 -3.18 -2.86 -2.55 -2.23 -1 .91
9*/. -3.89 -3.54 -3. 18 -2.83 -2.47 -2.12
8*/. -4.38 -3.98 -3.58 -3.18 -2.78 -2.39
7*/, -5.00 -4.55 -4.09 -3.64 -3. 18 -2.73
6*/. -5.83 -5.30 -4.77 -4.24 -3.71 -3.18
5’/. -7.00 -6.36 -5.73 -5.09 -4.45 -3.82
47. -8.75 -7.96 -7.16 -6.36 -5.57 -4.77
3*/. -11.67 -10.61 -9.55 -8.49 -7.42 -6.36
27. -17.50 -15.91 -14.32 -12.73 -11. 14 -9.55
17. -35.00 -31.82 -28.64 -25.47 -22.27 -19.09
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Table 3.13 
Eisenhower and Nixon-Ford Estimation 
{t-statistics in parentheses)
«o - Eisenhower constant 74.32 (24.37)
(lo - Nixon-Ford differential -11.27 (-3.07)
«l - Eisenhower pa -0.72 <-2.85)
- Nixon-Ford d ifferential 0.65 ( 2.57)
«E - Eisenhower JJ3 -0.30 (-2.93)
$E?. - Nixon-Ford differential 0.10 ( 0.92)
0£a - Eisenhower Honey 0.09 ( 0.37)
(*3 - Nixon-Ford differential 0.14 ( 0.46)
- Nixon-Ford Water -13.65 (-8.15)
6 -- Eisenhower ad justment 0.39 < 4.34)
c -• Nixon-Ford differential 0.46 ( 1 .22)
Adjusted R® = 0.91
Standard Error of the Regression = 3.75 
Log of Likelihood Function = -465.68 
Durbin m-statistic = 0.41
Table 3.14 




-  Reagan Intercept
- Nixon-Ford differential
7 9 . 6 6
- 1 6 . 6 2
( 3 4 .06 )  
( - 5 . 5 7 )
o<i - Reagan P®
- Nixon-Ford differential
- 0 . 1 1
0 . 0 4
C-3.47)  
( 1 . 0 7 )
0(a
fie
-  Reagan U®
-  Nixon-Ford differential
- 0 . 3 5
0 . 1 5
( - 1 0 . 8 9 )  
( 2 . 7 6 )
<Xa -  Reagan Honey
-  Nixon-Ford differential
1 .01 
- 0 . 7 8
( 3 . 3 7 )  
( - 2 . 2 1 )
OCe. - Reagan Iran
-  Nixon-Ford Water
-10.11 
- 1 3 . 6 5
(-5.55)
( - 8 . 9 9 )
s -
c -
- Reagan adjustment 
Nixon-Ford differential
0 . 6 3
-0.08
( 6 . 4 0 )  
( - 0 . 5 2 )
Adjusted R® = 0.889
Standard Error of the Regression = 3.40 
Log of Likelihood Function = -453.71 
Durbin m,-statistic = 1.13
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Figure 3.1
















q„ 4 „ Figure 3.2
































































Social Preferences) the Phillips Curve» and the Political
Business Cycle
4.1 Introduction
Until the late 1960s or early 1970s most 
macroeconomists believed it passible to exploit a Phillips 
curve relationship to permanently lower unemployment at the 
expense of a higher permanent inflation rate or conversely) 
to permanently decrease inflation while accepting a 
permanently increased unemployment rate. The evidence of 
the 1970s and the works by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) 
caused the concept to be replaced by a vertical long run 
Phillips curve and a downward sloping expectations augmented 
short run Phillips curve. This short-run curve could be 
exploited only until expectations were revised upwards.
The expectations-augmented short-run Phillips curve led 
to the development of political business cycle models such 
as those by Nordhaus <1975), MacRae (1977), Tufte (1978), 
and Barro and Gordon (1983). The usual scenario envisions 
an administration maximizing a quadratic popularity function 
subject to the constraint of the short-run Phillips curve by 
reducing unemployment, and consequently allowing the 
inflation rate to rise. In Figure . 1, if we begin at Point 
A at the natural rate of unemployment, the administration 
would seek to move in a leftward direction along Pis to point
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B, the highest possible popularity level. Following the 
election* as inflation expectations are revised upward* the 
economy returns to the natural rate of unemployment with a 
higher inflation rate and lower presidential popularity.1 
This is represented on Figure 4.1 by a shift in the Phillips 
curve to Pf and the new long run equilibrium at point C.
Several empirical studies have attempted to see whether 
or not such a pattern is to be observed over an election
cycle— for instance Frey and Schneider (1978) and Golden and 
Poterba (1980). Tufte (1978, 11) finds that 70’/. of the
countries in his analysis experienced a political business 
cycle to some degree. He also provides specific evidence of 
the cycle occurring in United States post-war history.
Though these works attest to the presence of a cycle,
we have seen no empirical evidence to date which explores
whether or not there are worthwhile gains to be achieved in 
terms of increased popularity from exploiting the short-run 
Phillips curve relationship. The extent of the popularity 
gains will obviously depend upon the slope of the
indifference curve derived from the public’s social 
preference function and the slope of the expectations
1It should be noted that a president may have 
motivations other than winning a reelection campaign for 
maintaining a high popularity rating. His success in having 
his legislative agenda passed in Congress has been shown to 
depend in large part upon his personal popularity (see 
□strom and Simon (1985)). As the leader of his party, the 
President’s popularity may affect the election hopes of 
party members to other governmental positions.
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augmented Phillips curve. In addition* gains will also 
depend upon the speed with which inflation expectations are 
revised (thus how quickly the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve will shift) and the extent to which the 
voting public can correctly guess the policy objectives of 
the administration.
If we assume that inflation expectations adjust quite 
rapidly or that the voting public accurately predicts the 
administration's policy objectives then the popularity gains 
from exploiting the short-run Phillips curve are zero. We 
believe* however* that intervention can affect short-run 
popularity* though the empirical evidence indicates that the 
gains are so small as to make the undertaking unappealing.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to determining 
the popularity gains which could be possible from exploiting 
the Phillips curve relationship for each of the Republican 
presidencies. Since the macroeconomic coefficients in the 
social preference function for Kennedy-Johnson and Carter 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 are insignificant, we cannot 
examine in a meaningful manner popularity gains for these 
administrations. Section 4.2 provides a brief discussion of 
the Phillips curve. Sections 4.3-4.S give the estimated 
Phillips curves and popularity gains for each of the 
Republican administrations. Finally* comparisons between 
the three administrations and conclusions are given in 
section 4.6.
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4.E The Expectations—Augmented Phillips Curve
Most analyses of dynamic inflationary behavior 
typically assume that the rate of inflation along a given 
short-run Phillips curve is determined by the differential 
between the observed unemployment rate and the natural rate 
as fo1 lows:
P = f(U - IT) (it. 1 )
where P and U are the inflation and actual unemployment 
rates and U* is the the natural rate of unemployment so that 
LI — IT is the deviation from the natural rate. The 
difference between one short-run Phillips curve and another 
is the expected rate of inflation. Accordingly, we form an 
"expectations augmented" Phillips curve by modifying 
equation *t.l to include the expected rate of inflation:
P = f (U - LT ) + P® (*t.2)
This relationship implies that the unemployment rate 
may be below (above) the natural rate only as long as the 
actual rate of inflation exceeds (lags behind) the expected 
rate of inflation. When P = P™, wages rise as rapidly as
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prices, U must equal U~, and we are then on the long-run 
Phillips curve.=
It is obvious from equation 4.2 that one of the driving 
forces in Phillips curve behavior is the expected rate of 
inflation, yet there is much debate concerning the way in 
which expectations are formed. The simplest idea and the 
one which most readily lends itself to empirical estimation 
is to assume that P« depends upon past inflation and thus 
P^sP-i. it is this expectations scheme which we adopt in 
the empirical work which follows.
4.3 Popularity Maximization for the Reagan Administration
Within this section, we first estimate a short-run 
expectations augmented Phillips curve for the Reagan 
administration. Next, we develop mathematically the
formulas for generating gains in popularity which will be 
used for the Reagan, Nixon-Ford, and Eisenhower regimes. 
Finally, we discuss the actual gains in popularity which 
Reagan could achieve by the generation of a political 
business cycle.
4.3.1 The Reagan Phillips Curve
^See Dernburg (1985, 296-302) and Branson (1989, 495- 
515) for a general discussion of the Phillips curve 
relationship. Gordon (1976) provides a nice discussion of 
the development of Phillips curve theory.
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We modify equation 4.E for the Reagan administration to 
yield an expectations augmented Phillips curve of the 
following form
p  _  p -  -  k <|j _  y ~ )  +  n p n  +  s ( 4 . 3 )
k < 0 n > 0
In addition to the variables introduced earlier, P rn is the 
rate of inflation of energy prices. The unexpected rate of 
inflation is P - P ”. We include the rate of inflation of
energy prices because if there is an unexpected increase
(decrease) in inflation because of an increase (decrease) in 
energy prices this will not greatly benefit (harm) domestic 
unemployment because much of the benefit (loss) accrues to 
foreign firms.
We estimate the expectations augmented Phillips curve 
in equation 4.3 using annual data for the period 1977 to 
1988. We use annual data because a lag of this length
allows the short-run Phillips curve to generate a
potentially significant fall in unemployment. Unexpected 
inflation is measured by the difference between the 
inflation rate in the current year and the previous year, so 
that P - P" = P - P-i. We tried alternative measures of 
expected inflation based upon the Livingston and University 
of Michigan Survey Research Center data without obtaining 
superior results and so present the simpler and more readily
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interpretable formulation here. We also estimated the 
short-run Phillips curve over a longer time period and both 
with and without time trends and energy prices. Our 
estimates of k and U* are remarkably robust over all the 
alternative specifications.
Table 4.1 reports the estimations of equation 4.3. All 
coefficients are significant at the 99*/. confidence level and 
the Durbin Watson coefficient indicates no serial 
correlation at the 95*/. confidence level. The slope of the 
short-run Phillips curve is given by k = -1.29 and the 
natural rate of unemployment, U*, is 6.73.3
4.3.S Popularity Maximization Using the Short-Run Phillips 
Curve
For any particular short-run Phillips curve 
presidential popularity is maximized at the tangency 
position between that particular short-run expectations 
augmented Phillips curve and the indifference curve. The 
slope of the short-run Phillips curve is k and that of the 
equilibrium indifference curve (from Chapters £ and 3) is
dP/dU = -<Te/Ti)U/P (4.4)
3This estimated natural rate of unemployment is 
slightly larger than Gordon’s (19B7) estimate of 65i for the 
Reagan years. However, a lower natural rate of unemployment 
would lessen the gains from exploiting the Phillips curve 
tradeoff.
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where Ti and represent the equilibrium coefficients of
inflation and unemployment respectively. Equating these and 
rearranging yields
P = -(Th / T i )U/k (A.5)
The tangency locus for the Reagan administration is 
graphed in Figure ^.2 together with the natural rate of 
unemployment. Unless the economy is already at a tangency 
position on the locus a movement along a short-run Phillips 
curve can increase Presidential popularity. Depending on 
whether the initial position is to the right or the left of 
the locus increasing popularity will involve moving up or 
down the short-run Phillips curve. In the first case, the 
short-run Phillips curve is flatter than the relevant 
indifference curves and popularity is increased by a short- 
run lowering of unemployment at the expense of increased 
inflation. In the second case, the short-run Phillips curve 
is steeper than the relevant indifference curves and 
popularity is increased by lowering inflation at the expense 
of increased unemployment.
How big an increase in popularity is it possible far an 
administration to generate? For simplicity we shall suppose 
that the economy is initially in equilibrium on the vertical 
long-run Phillips curve at the natural rate of unemployment 
so that the actual and expected inflation rates are equal.
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We make this assumption so that we can concentrate on an 
administration-caused move along the short-run Phillips
curve without having to disentangle this movement from
shifts in the short-run Phillips curve which would 
necessarily occur if unemployment is not initially at the 
natural rate.
To estimate how large an effect the administration can 
have on popularity by exploiting the short-run Phillips 
curve it is necessary to derive the locus of values of 
unemployment and inflation for any particular value of 
expected inflation. In the following we assume that the 
rate of inflation of energy prices is 2 ero» P1-1 = 0. Since
the average annual energy inflation rate was 0.7*/. over the
Reagan years, this assumption is not unreasonable. We also 
assume that the disturbance term is zero, S = 0.
Recall that the presidential popularity function 
estimated for the Reagan administration was
Y = |19 + + (lsPE + (3aUe + fl^Iran + desHoney (4.6)
We make the estimates assuming a time span after the end of 
the honeymoon period and before the Iran-Contra affair! 
thus, we set H = I = 0. We estimate the popularity
maximizing combinations of the rates of unemployment and 
inflation one year hence using the equilibrium estimates of 
the indifference map (that is, assuming that adjustment is
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complete) Y = Y_ij and assuming that there is no change in 
the expected rate of inflation). If we allow Ti =
) ) Te» = fle/<l ~ Gi ) ) and t3 = (i3 /Cl - (Si) then the social 
preference function is reduced to
Y = To + TiP^ + TeUE <4.7)
Combining the expression for the tangency position in 
equation 4.5 with the short-run Phillips curve in equation
4.3 yields the following presidential popularity maximizing 
unemployment and inflation rates
U = kTx < kLT - P“ ) / < ke Ti + ts ) < 4 . S )
P = -TE (kU- - P«)/<ke Ti + Te ) <4.9)
Substituting these values of U and P into equation 4.7 and 
simplifying gives the popularity maximizing level, Ym„„,
Ym „„ = To + TiTB <kLT - P" )E / < ke Ti + te > (4.10)
Making the same assumptions as before and substituting 
U" for U and P*» for P in equation 4.7 yields the pre-policy 
popularity rates, Yo**, at the natural rate of unemployment 
given by
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Y„«tr " To + T1 P™E + TeU*E
Then the increase in presidential popularity, Yi„<=» is the
difference between Ym*„ and Y,-,*̂  and is given by
Yirtc Ym «K Y ti ^
= “ (kTiP" + Tesir )s /(ke Ti + TS ) ( 4 . 1E >
The appropriate estimated values of tc, , Ti and ts , 
found in equation 3.9, are 79.At, -0.11 and -0.35 
respectively. The slope of the Phillips curve, k, is -1.29 
and U**' is 6.73. Table *f.H employs these values and 
alternative values of expected inflation to yield the levels 
of presidential popularity at the natural rate of 
unemployment, Ynmt) at the popularity maximizing rates of 
inflation and unemployment, Ym«„, and the difference between 
the two, Yir)<= .
The gains from moving up the short-run Phillips curve 
are greatest when the expected rate of inflation is low;
they are much less if we start from a higher expected rate
of inflation. Low inflation rate ranges are not likely to 
be very relevant for popularity maximizing policy attempts. 
First, if the inflation rate is low then presidential 
popularity is already high and there is no need to embark on 
a popularity increasing expedition up the short-run Phillips 
curve. Secondly, it is not likely that an administration
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will have much opportunity to start from low inflation rates
—  in only one of the past twenty years, 1986, has the 
annual rate of inflation been substantially below four 
percent and that was as the result of a favorable energy 
price shock. Thus we need to concentrate on the gains that 
can be achieved when inflation rates are above four percent.
If the initial equilibrium inflation rate is five 
percent then popularity maximizing will increase popularity 
by about five percentage points. As the assumed initial 
rate of inflation increases the gains decline quite rapidly
—  declining to zero with an initial inflation rate of 16 
percent. At higher initial inflation rates popularity can 
be increased by moving down a short-run Phillips curve, 
reducing inflation and increasing unemployment.
With realistic inflation rates the increase in 
popularity of a few percentage points is not very 
substantial particularly if one bears in mind that the 
standard error of the estimated social welfare function is 
S.6 percentage points. Moreover, there are a number of 
reasons for believing that our estimates are on the high 
side and that the actual increase that an administration can 
achieve is likely to be significantly less than the Table 
4.2 estimates.
First, the calculations have been made on the 
assumption that price expectations are unchanged for a year. 
If rising inflation causes inflation expectations to
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increase before a year is over then the short-run Phillips 
curve will move upwards, the actual rate of inflation will 
be increased, and so the gains in popularity will be 
reduced. i
Second, if agents in the economy correctly predict the 
policy objectives of the administration then expected 
inflation will increase and again the short-run Phillips 
curve will shift upwards.
Third, it will take some time for an administration to 
affect the inflation-unemployment mix and it may not be 
possible to move to the maximization position within a year.
Fourth, the equilibrium indifference curves have been 
used for the calculations. We have seen that the public 
adjusts its presidential ratings to macroeconomic changes 
quite speedily but as the inflation-unemployment mix will be 
continually changing, adjustment of the popularity function 
may not be complete within a year so that popularity may not 
have increased to the equilibrium levels given in Table A.S.
Fifth, we have assumed that the short-run Phillips 
curves are linear between inflation and the unemployment 
rate. If non-linearity is present at low unemployment rates 
so that the short-run Phillips curves is convex to the 
origin then by incorrectly using a linear relation we shall 
underestimate the popularity maximizing inflation rate, 
overestimate Ym(inK and overestimate Y iriC:. We tested to see 
if the short-run Phillips relationship was non-linear and
13B
■found no evidence of non-linearity but as we have few low 
unemployment observations we cannot be sure that non- 
linearity is not present.
Sixth, the calculations suppose that the administration 
is able to direct its policy so as to achieve the tangency 
position. We doubt that politicians are sufficiently adept 
at precisely manipulating economic variables especially 
given the United States political structure in which 
economic power is divided between the President, the 
Congress and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
We conclude that while it is theoretically possible for 
an administration to increase presidential popularity by 
moving up the short-run Phillips curve, the gains achieved 
are unlikely to be very substantial or very certain.
4.4 Popularity Maximization for the Nixon-Ford 
Administration
4.4.1 The Nixon Political Business Cycle Activity
Of all presidents in post-war history, perhaps Richard 
Nixon was most concerned with the effects of economic 
prosperity on his re-election possibilities in the 1972 
election. Tufte (1980, 45-55) delineates the efforts
undertaken in both fiscal and monetary actions which 
contributed to a booming pre-election economy. Social 
security benefits increased by 20 percent in October, 1972 
financed by a post-election increase in contributions. In
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fact, almost every type of transfer accelerated in late 1972 
and declined after the election. Veteran’s benefits and 
federal grants in aid to state and local governments also 
increased substantially as election day drew near.
To a certain extent one may say that Nixon’s efforts 
were rewarded by the November victory. Was this victory due 
to the economic manipulation or to other factors? Our 
analysis of popularity gains from the exploitation of the 
short-run Phillips curve will yield some insight. As with 
the Reagan administration, we develop a short-run 
expectations augmented Phillips curve for Nixon-Ford and 
analyze the popularity increases resulting from its
exploitation.
A.A.2 The Phillips Curve for the Nixon-Ford Years
Just as the political sphere was in flux during much of 
the Nixon-Ford administration, the economic realm was in a 
state of turmoil during these years as well. The oil price 
shocks accompanied by a variety of other factors caused many 
economists to feel as if the traditional Phillips curve 
relationship had altogether collapsed; other economists
explained the observed simultaneous increases in inflation 
and unemployment as a series of rightward shifts in the 
curve. It is this view which we adopt.
Because of these changes, we estimate the Phillips
curve relation in equation A.3 over a relatively short time
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period) 1967— 1977. The results are presented in Table 4.3. 
The slope of the curve» -1.06) is somewhat smaller in 
absolute terms than that for the Reagan years. The natural 
rate of unemployment) assuming zero energy inflation) is 
4.E8 percent) again lower than for the Reagan years. Though 
the Durbin h-statistic is a bit high) the negative serial 
correlation causes the t-statistics to be understated rather 
than biased upward. As with the Reagan Phillips
relationship) we estimated several other specifications—  
nonlinear) including and excluding time trends) using other 
measures of expected inflation— and found this specification 
to be as good as or superior to any of the other 
formulations.
4.4.3 Popularity Maximization for the Nixon-Ford Regime
The popularity maximizing values for the Nixon-Ford 
administration may be found by substituting the values of k> 
U*1 ) To) T). ) and relevant to this regime into equations
4.10) 4.11) and 4.12. We initially assume) as with the 
Reagan administration) that energy inflation is zero. The 
resulting gains are presented in Table 4.4.
The gains from exploiting the short-run Phillips curve 
are very small. At five percent expected inflation) for 
example) popularity at the natural rate is 57.81 points as
“'♦The equilibrium values for t 0) T i and are 63.04) 
-0.07 and -0.19 respectively and are found in equation 3.6.
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compared to a maximum popularity of 58.54, an increase in 
popularity of only 0.73 percentage points. These increases 
decline to zero at an initial expected inflation rate of 11 
percent. The positive increases in popularity above 11 
percent expected inflation come as a result of "reverse" 
business cycle activity: decreasing inflation at the
expense of higher unemployment. From these estimates, 
Nixon's efforts at increasing his reelection opportunities 
by economic manipulation were not very fruitful.
One may argue that due to increasing energy prices 
during the Nixon-Ford regime the natural rate of
unemployment was much higher than our estimated rate. Thus 
our estimates of possible popularity increases are low 
because they are based on a natural rate of unemployment 
dependent upon zero energy inflation rates. Table 4.5 
presents the gains in popularity if we assume 3 percent 
energy inflation, the average rate during Nixon’s first 
term. The resultant natural rate of unemployment is 4.93 
percent. These figures indicate that while popularity gains 
are indeed larger than those presented in Table 4.4, they 
are still quite small, so small as to make the generation of 
political business cycles unattractive.
The large increases in energy prices occurred in the 
second Nixon-Ford term; the average annual energy inflation 
rate for 1973-1976 was 13 percent. Table 4.5 also presents 
the popularity gains possible if we assume the natural rate
14E
of unemployment is 7.26 percent, the rate consistent with 13 
percent energy inflation. Two points are noteworthy.
First, the gains in popularity when the natural rate of
unemployment is high are much larger than when the natural 
rate is lower. Second, the increase in popularity gains 
associated with increases in energy inflation rates (and 
thus the natural rate of unemployment) are not equal in 
magnitude at different rates of expected inflation. For 
example, at S ’A expected inflation the increases in 
popularity associated with 37. and 137. energy inflation are 
1.19 and 3.78 points respectively, a change of 2.9 points. 
If we assume initial expected inflation of 107. the increases 
in popularity possible at 37. and 137. energy inflation rates 
are .14 and 1.47 points respectively, a change of only 1.33 
points.
Tufte (1978) documents that Nixon was extremely
concerned with the possible election outcomes associated 
with a depressed economy. As a result of these fears,
Nixon’s pre-election economic policies followed "textbook" 
political business cycle patterns: large increases in
spending and possibly manipulation of the money supply to 
create economic prosperity and thus to ensure re-election. 
Though overall economic prosperity may have contributed to 
his November, 1972, victory our analysis indicates that
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Nixon’s economic machinations did not substantially increase 
his papularity.a
4.5 Popularity Maximization "For the Eisenhower
Administration
In estimating the inflation-unemployment tradeoff for 
Eisenhower we modify equation 4.3 by excluding the energy 
inflation rate. Energy inflation was not deemed a serious 
problem prior to the 1970s and so we do not include it in 
our regression analysis. We estimate the Phillips curve 
relationship using yearly data from 1954 to 1969. Data 
previous to 1954 is somewhat distorted by the effects of the 
Korean conflict and wage price controls. 1969 roughly 
corresponds to the beginning of rising inflation rates.
Table 4.6 presents the results of our estimation. All 
coefficients are statistically significant and the Durbin- 
Watson statistic indicates no presence of serially 
correlated errors. The slope of this Phillips curve is much 
flatter than that for the corresponding Reagan and Nixon- 
Ford curves.
These results are far from optimal. None of the other 
specifications we examined provided markedly better results* 
however. In preliminary estimation we explored different 
measures of inflation, used the actual rate of inflation
®We feel that our actual estimates of gains in 
popularity for the Nixon-Ford term are biased upward for the 
same reasons as listed in section 4.3.E.
1AA
rather than the unexpected rate as the dependent variable, 
and tried nonlinear rather than linear formulations. For 
varying reasons, each of these specifications was 
unsatisfactory as well. As a result we present this 
formulation because although a large portion of the error 
variance is unaccounted for by the model it is consistent 
with the functional form adopted in the Reagan and Nixon- 
Ford analyses.
A possible reason for the poor performance of the 
Phillips curve is that there was a small variance in 
inflation over the time period. In the actual years of the 
Eisenhwoer term, for example, inflation’s maximum value was 
3.83 percent and its minimum value was -0.87 percent. This 
meant a very small variation in P® as well.6
Ue substitute the values of k and U* as well as the 
values of Ti and into equations A.10, A.11, and A.IS to
obtain Eisenhower’s popularity at the natural rate of 
unemployment and at.the maximizing level and the increase in 
popularity. These calculations are presented in Table A.7.
An interesting feature of these results is that the 
increases in popularity first decline and then increase as
‘H'ie regressed P on P — * and unemployment in preliminary 
research. The coefficient of P_i was not significantly 
different from one justifying our use of P - P® as the 
dependent variable.
’’These values are found in equation 3.2 The 
equilibrium intercept, inflation, and unemployment values 
are 7^.31, -0.72, and -0.30.
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expected inflation rises. This phenomena may be explained 
through the use of Figure 4.1. If we initially begin at 
point A at U~ along P?J> (<Pr>> increases in popularity may be 
obtained by decreasing unemployment and allowing inflation 
to rise, causing a move to point B. Gains in popularity 
from this political business cycle behavior would persist 
for any Phillips curve between Pg and P*j. If we begin at 
point C, gains in popularity are zero as we are already at 
the popularity maximizing level consistent with Pf. 
Finally, assume we begin at point E at U" along P£ (>Pf). 
Popularity maximizing behavior would require actions to 
decrease inflation while allowing unemployment to rise until 
point D is reached. The behavior patterns for the 
Eisenhower administration would also be seen for the other 
administrations if we considered Phillips curves consistent 
with sufficiently high expected inflation rates.
As the Ylnc column indicates, the gains from exploiting 
the Phillips curve are very small for the Eisenhower term, 
confirming our findings for the other two Republican 
regimes. These results are quite tenuous, however, due to 
our lack of real confidence in the estimated Phillips curve.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has developed a framework from which we 
may determine the increases in popularity afforded a 
president by undertaking political business cycle
1 4 6
activities. We have applied this structure to data for the 
Reagan* Nixon-Ford, and Eisenhower administrations. Though 
our results for the Eisenhower administration are weak, the 
conclusions drawn from the more recent Reagan and Nixon-Ford 
administrations are quite strong.
We have shown that an administration cannot generate 
substantial short-run increases in popularity by exploiting 
a short-run expectations augmented Phillips curve. Though 
the Nixon administration undertook to stimulate the economy 
before the 1972 presidential election, our results indicate 
that his actual popularity gains from undertaking this 
action were quite small. This evidence indicates that 
informed administrations will not find it worthwhile to 
create political business cycles.
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Table 4.1


















Alternative Rates of Expected 
Reagan Administration
Inflation
pK 7 run _ 7 rri« )-(__ 7 1 ncs_
IS’/* 47.97 48.78 0.81
117. 50 .50 51 .69 1 . 19
10*/. 52.81 54.46 1 .65
97. 54.90 57.09 2.19
8'/. 56.77 59.67 2.90
7 V. 58.42 61 .90 3.48
6V. 59.85 64. 10 4.25
57. 61 .06 66.14 5.08
47. 62.05 68.05 6.00
37. 62.82 69.81 6.99
27. 63.37 71 .42 8.05
17. 63.70 72.89 9. 19
07. 63. B1 74.22 10.41
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Table 4.3
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve Estimates, 1967-1977
Nixon-Ford Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)








D-UI statistic S. 55
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Table 4.4
Presidential Popularity for the Nixon-Ford Administration 
with Alternative Rates of Expected Inflation 
Zero Energy Inflation Rate
p«tt Y +J_ Y m a ĥ . _YlnC_
13*/. A7 .73 47.81 0.08
12*/. 49.4B 49.50 0.02
11*/. 51 .09 51 .09 0.00
10*/. 52.56 52.58 0.02
9*/. 53.89 53.99 0. 10
8'/. 55.08 55.26 0. 18
7*/. 56. 13 56.45 0.32
6*/. 57.04 57.54 0.50
5*/. 57.81 58.54 0.73
hV, 58.58 59.43 0.85
3*/. 58.93 60.23 1 .30
2*/. 59.28 60.92 1 .64
1*/. 59.49 61 .52 2.03
0*/. 59.56 62.02 2.46
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Table **.5
Presidential Popularity for Nixon-Ford Administration 
with Alternative Rates of Expected Inflation 
3'/. and 13*/ Energy Inflation Rates*
ptB V .t
13V. A6.59 A6.59 0.00
A1 . SO A1 .BA 0.6A
is*/ AB.3A AB.35 0.01
AS. 95 A3.8A 0.89
u*/. A9.95 50.01 0.06
AA.56 A5.7A 1 . 18
10*/. 51 .AS 51 .56 0. 1A
A6.07 A7.5A 1 . A7
9'/. 53.75 53.03 0.37
A7.36 A9.3A 1 .91
a*/. 53 .9A 5A.3B O.AA
AS. 55 50.8A 3.39
7 •/. 5A.99 55.6A 0.65
A9.60 53.35 3.75
6*/. 55.90 56. BO 0.90
50.51 53.75 3.3A
5*/. 56.67 57.86 1 . 19
51 .38 55.06 3.7B
A*/. 57.30 58.83 1 .53
51 .91 56.37 A. 36
3*/. 57.79 59.69 1 .90
53. AO 57.38 A. 98
E*/. 58. 1A 60. A6 3.33
53.75 58.39 5.6A
1*/. 58.35 61 . 13 3.77
53.96 59.30 6.3A
07. 5B.A3 61 .69 3.37
53.03 60. 11 7.08
*The first number in each cell corresponds to 3*/. energy
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A Disaggregated Model of Popularity
5.1 Introduction
□ur study to this point has assumed that various 
sectors of the public respond in similar fashion to
fluctuations in the economy. It is possible that there will 
be variances in approval ratings across groups in society, 
however, due to differences in objectives, interests, and 
partisan viewpoints of individuals. As Hibbs <1982, 326) 
states
It is natural to expect political responses to
macroeconomic performance to vary across groups 
because the burdens and rewards conferred by 
fluctuations in aggregate economic conditions are 
very unevenly distributed within the electorate.
Hibbs (1982), Chappell and Keech (1985a) and honroe 
(1984) have examined popularity ratings disaggregated by
occupational group, income, race, sex, and age. Hibbs 
(1982) employs a logit model to explain political support by 
occupational and partisan groups. His model regresses 
quarterly Gallup Poll data from 1961—1979 on unemployment, 
inflation, rate of change of real disposable income, number 
killed per quarter in Vietnam, a Watergate dummy, and a 
rally variable taken from Mueller (1970). He also accounts
for the public’s evaluation of performance relative to the 
President’s predecessor’s record and relative to his own
1 5 6
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past performance. He reports substantial differences in 
macroeconomic perceptions along partisan lines* though does 
not present rigorous tests of this finding.
Chappell and Keech (1985) also examine popularity 
functions disaggregated by occupation* political party* and 
level of education within their "sophisticated" and "naive" 
models discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. Employing 
quarterly data for 1957:1-1980:4, they find in the "naive" 
model that Republicans punish inflation less and place more 
emphasis on output than do Democrats. There is no 
perceptable trend by level of education. The
"sophisticated" model is far more difficult to interpret in 
these terms.
Monroe (1984) presents analyses for every 
classification made by the Gallup organization, employing 
bi-monthly data for 1965-1980. Her independent variables 
for each category include real disposable personal income, 
change in government expenditures on social welfare, and a 
stock market index in addition to inflation and unemployment 
rates. It is probable, therefore, that multicol1 inearity in 
the data has caused most of her coefficients to be 
statistically insignificant.
Though these pieces provide some useful information, 
the empirical work is flawed in the same manner as the 
current literature on the aggregate popularity function is
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flawed. Since these are enumerated in detail in Chapter 1, 
only a brief summary is required here.
First, the estimated popularity functions include 
inflation and unemployment linearly, thus implying a linear 
tradeoff between the two macroeconomic variables in the 
public’s social preference function. Second, the estimation 
ends with the Carter administration, providing no evidence 
for the Reagan years. Third, the estimation spans several 
presidential regimes without allowing for any change in 
perceptions toward inflation or unemployment.
In this chapter we explore presidential popularity 
functions disaggregated by race, sex, political party, and 
geographical region. In order to improve upon the current 
offerings, we estimate the function as a quadratic to allow 
the social preference function to be concave to the origin. 
Due to the evidence suggested in the aggregate model, each 
presidential administration is treated individually. We 
explore whether particular groups are more influenced by the 
unemployment rate relating specifically to them or to the 
overall unemployment rate. Finally, rigorous tests are 
conducted to determine if economic perceptions are 
significantly different across disaggregated groups.
5.8 The Data and the Model
The Gallup organization provides monthly presidential 
popularity data disaggregated into several subgroups. This
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study will examine this data by race* by sex, by political 
party, and by geographical region. The dependent variable 
in each category is the percentage who responds "approve’1 to 
the Gallup Poll question "Do you approve or disapprove of
the way Mr. _______  is handling the job of President?" The
series are formed in the same manner as in the aggregate 
model presented in Chapter S.
There are two classifications given by the Gallup 
organization for race: white and minority. These data are
available on a consistent monthly basis for 1970:2-1984:12.1 
Though some observations exist previous to 1970, they are 
quite sparse. In addition, it is unfortunate that no 
disaggregated data on a monthly basis is available for the 
second Reagan administration. Thus all of our disaggregated 
analyses encompass only the first Reagan term.e
Data disaggregated by sex are available monthly for 
1969:1-1984:12. Thus it is possible to estimate the entire
lIn preliminary research the macroeconomic coefficients 
for the Carter administration were statistically 
insignificant as in the aggregegate analysis. Because no 
new information is gained from these results and in order to 
conserve space the results for the Carter administration are 
presented only for the model disaggregated by political 
party.
^No interpolations are made for the following dates: 
1970:6-1970:8, 1972:7, 1972:11, 1973:3-1973:5, 1974:8-
1974:9, and 1976:7-1977:1. Gaps exist in the data for these 
periods. The Nixon-Ford administration is thus estimated 
from 1970:2-1976:6 exclusive of the periods listed above. 
The Reagan administration is estimated from 1981:2-1984:12.
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Nixon-Ford administration as well as the first Reagan regime 
for men and women.13
Respondants to the Gallup survey are also classified as 
''Democrat," “Republican," or "Independent." For these 
purposes, those individuals identifying themselves with any 
party other than the two major parties are grouped as 
Independents. We estimate this time series data from 
1969:2-19B4:12.“* We include the Carter term here in hopes 
of finding an explanation in partisan support for the 
insignificance of economic coefficients in Carter's 
aggregate model.
The last grouping we examine is classification by 
geographical region. The Gallup organization employs four 
regions: East, Midwest, South, and West.® The models
disaggregated by region are estimated for Nixon-Ford and 
Reagan. **
^Once more, the monthly observations are formed in the 
manner described in Chapter 2. Gaps in the data are left 
for the following time periods: 1970:6-1970:7, 1972:7-
1972:10, 1973:3-1973:5, 1974:8, and 1976:7-1977:1.
“*Gaps in the data are left for 1970:6-1970:7, 1972:7- 
1972:10, 1974:8, and 1976:6-1977:1.
“Those states classified as "east" are ME, NH, VT, MA,
RI, CT, NY, NJ, PN, MD, DE, WV, and Washington D.C. The
midwestern states are OH, MI, IN, IL, WI, MN, IA, MO, ND, 
SD, NE, and KS. Southern states include VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, 
KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, LA, OK, and TX . Finally, western states
are MT, AZ, CO, ID, WY, UT, NV, NM, CA, OR, WA, AK, and HI.
• T̂he Nixon-Ford term is estimated from 1969:2-1976:12 
exclusive of gaps in the following places: for 1972:7-
1972:10, 1973:3-1973:4, 1974:8, and 1976:7-1976:12.
Reagan’s term is estimated from 1981:2-1984:12.
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The inflation series employed in each analysis is that 
employed in the aggregate model as are the honeymoon and 
Watergate dummy variables. Since the Reagan administration 
is estimated for the first term only* no Iran variable is 
included in this analysis. The unemployment series employed 
throughout is also the series used in the aggregate model* 
though we examine the possibility that minorities (whites)* 
for example, may be more concerned with the minority (white) 
unemployment rate than the overall rate. This analysis is 
also carried out for men and women and for geographical 
region.
The model to be estimated for each classification and 
each regime is as follows:
Y* = £*(«0 + (X iP12 + cxet)®1) + ( l-Jot) Ya-, + otoHoney
+ €„ (5.1)
Yr, = + (3* P*2 + fla^) + (1-<?« > Yft-x + feHoney
+ £ra ( 5 . S )
where Ya and Yffl, £„ and £& represent the dependent variable 
and adjustment processes respectively of two groups. The 
model may be expanded to include as many categories as 
necessary.-7 The merit of estimating the model in this
7Two modifications must be made for the Nixon-Ford 
administration. First, since the data disaggregated by race 
begins in 1970 there is no honeymoon variable for this set
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fashion is that the a* and ( 1 coefficients are the 
equilibrium values which exist after all adjustments have 
been made. Hypothesis tests may thus be applied directly to 
the equilibrium values.® The equation is estimated as a
quadratic in inflation and unemployment to yield the desired 
concave social preference functions.
5.3 The Estimation Technique
The popularity function presented in the previous 
section could be estimated for each disaggregate category 
individually by nonlinear least squares. This estimation 
technique implicitly assumes* however* that the different 
regressions do not contain any common unmeasurable or 
omitted factors at a given point in time. Given that each 
group has the same information, this assumption is not 
likely to hold. Whites and minorities, for example* are 
both affected the President’s handling of domestic violence 
and other issues which are not accounted for in the model. 
This contemporaneous correlation should be accounted for in 
the estimation of the model and thus we employ a seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) estimation technique for the 
disaggregated analysis.
of regressions. Second, the Nixon-Ford equation also 
includes the Watergate dummy variable.
®See Smyth, Washburn, and Dua (19B9a> and Section 3.7.2 
of this volume for more information.
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As Kennedy (1985, 1A1) relates, SUR consists of
creating a block matrix similar to that created in Chapter 
2. If we assume two subgroups, the system may be expressed 
as
~y r = 'Xi 0" (1 ! €*'
Ya 0 x e P s> + £ B*- — _
y~ = X*fl* + €~
where each y*. , fl*. , and €* are vectors and Xi is a data 
matr i x .
If we assume contemporaneous correlation between the 
error terms across the two equations so that €*= is 
correlated with , the variance-covariance matrix of £ will 
not be diagonal. By using the residuals from each equation 
estimated separately we may estimate these error 
correlations and the diagonal elements. This allows 
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of €* and 
generation of estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) 
estimates of
Judge, et. al. (1988, ^^3-^53) indicate that SUR
estimates are better than OLS in this case because it allows 
for the correlation between error vectors. Furthermore, it 
uses information on explanatory variables that are included
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in the system but which are excluded from the individual 
system.
5.3 The Choice of an Unemployment Rate
At this juncture we could simply estimate equations 5.1 
and 5.S by SUR for each disaggregated group to obtain group- 
specific responses to changes in inflation and unemployment. 
Before undertaking this task, however, it is of interest to 
explore whether these groups are more concerned with the 
unemployment rate directly influencing them (the "local" 
rate), or the overall, or national, unemployment rate. Do 
minorities, for example, judge the President’s performance 
based upon the minority unemployment rate or the overall 
unemployment rate?
Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) indicate that this issue 
may be resolved by including local and national unemployment 
rates in the same regression. If the coefficients of both 
rates are statistically insignificant then it is not 
possible to reject either hypothesis. If one is significant 
while the other is insignificant, then the variable with the 
significant coefficient is deemed superior. If both
coefficients are significant then both measures add 
important information and should be included. Models using 
just one measure are rejected. We thus modify equations 5.1 
and 5.2 to include local unemployment rates. Taking 
minorities vs. whites as an example, the equations become
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YW = £„ (Oo + 0 , 1 P2 + ofeLF + OaUUF) + (l-tfw )YW_i
+ <XtfHoney + <5. A)
YM = <?„, ((3r» + + (3SLF + (JaUî 3 + <l-5m )YM_a
+ Honey + £m (5.5>
where YW and YM refer to popularity by whites and minorities 
respectively and UW and UM refer to the monthly white and 
minority unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted, lagged one 
month. All other variables are as defined previously. 
Table 5.1 gives the results of this estimation for the
Nixon-Ford and Reagan administrations.'5’ The unemployment 
coefficients are insignificant in both equations) due in
large part to multico11 inearity between the two variables. 
We are thus unable to reject either unemployment rate in 
favor of the other from this analysis.
Table 5.S presents the results of a similar analysis 
disaggregated by sex. The local unemployment rates included 
in the regressions are those for men and women) lagged one
month) seasonally adjusted. For Nixon-Ford and Reagan and
for men and women both unemployment rates are insignificant)
Treliminary research indicated that the macroeconomic
variables for the Carter administration are statistically
insignificant in every disaggregate analysis. Since these 
results do not markedly increase our knowledge, in most 
cases we do not report findings for the Carter
administration in order to conserve space.
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though the national unemployment rate is closer to 
significance in most cases. It is therefore not possible 
from the Davidson-MacKinnon test to distinguish between the 
national and local unemployment rates for women and men.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides monthly 
regional unemployment rates for 197B-19BB, making it 
possible to conduct a similar national vs. local 
unemployment analysis by geographical region for the first 
Reagan term.10 Though there are slight differences in the 
states included in the Census division and the Gallup 
division, these differences are relatively minor.11
The results of the Davidson-MacKinnon regressions by 
region are found in Table 5.3. Unlike the previous
disaggregated analyses, these results allow us to make
10Recall that monthly disaggregated Gallup data is not 
available for the second Reagan term.
1 ̂ The census and Gallup divisions for ‘'West" and 
"Midwest" are identical. The Census classification of 
states in the Northeast is smaller than the corresponding 
"East" category used in Gallup analysis. Gallup includes 
MD, DE, WV» and Washington, D.C. as "East" while the Census 
classifies these states as "South".
1EThe Durbin h-statistic for the South is greater than 
the critical value, indicating the possible presence of 
serially corelated errors. When we corrected the equation 
for serial correlation, the resulting value of rho was 
0.092. Fomby, Hill, and Johnson (1984, 214) indicate that 
if the absolute value of rho is less tha 0.3 then very 
little loss is associated with failure to correct for serial 
correlation. In addition, the Durbin m-statistic for this 
equation was 0.3B7, indicating no presence of serially 
correlated errors. Kmenta <1986, 333) states "all things 
considered, the m test is to be preferred to the h test." 
For these reasons, we do not correct the South equation for 
autocorrelation.
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definitive statements with respect to the appropriate 
unemployment rate. For three regions, South, East, and 
West, the national unemployment rate is highly significant 
and the local rate is insignificant. Only for the Midwest
is the regional rate accepted and the national rate
rejected. When we examine the mean regional unemployment 
rates, the Midwest mean, 9.7BV,, is more than one percentage 
paint higher than either of the other regional rates or the 
national rate and its standard deviation is larger as well. 
The recession of the early eighties was felt most in this 
region and the regional rate most effectively captures this 
large divergence from the national rate of unemployment. In 
general, however, the local rate is rejected in favor of the 
national rate.
In the remainder of this chapter dealing with 
disaggregated groups, we use the overall or national 
unemployment rate in our regression analysis for two
reasons. First, in all cases either (1) the local rate was
rejected in favor of the national rate or <2) we could not 
reject either rate in favor of the other. Second, if we use 
the national unemployment rate in all regressions it is 
possihle to conduct rigorous tests comparing responses to 
unemployment between groups. This analysis would not be 
possible if we used a different rate in each regression.
5.5 Disaggregation by Race
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5.5.1 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
Applying SUR estimation to equations 5.1 and 5.2 for 
the Reagan period 1981:2-1984:12 yields the results 
presented in Table 5.4. 1=1 All coefficients for both 
equations are statistically significant and the Durbin h- 
statistics indicate no presence of serially correlated 
errors in either equation. The adjusted Re figures indicate 
that the economic factors do a far better job of explaining 
error variance for whites than for minorities.
Are the differences in the coefficients across whites 
and minority groups significant? To test the validity of 
restrictions that cross equation coefficients are equal, we 
apply the Wald test. According to Kmenta (1986, 4921 this 
test is based on the extent to which the restrictions are 
violated when restricted rather than unrestricted estimates 
are used. The Wald test statistic is distributed
asymptotically as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions being tested.1,£*
Column 1 of Table 5.5 gives the calculated chi-square 
values for several null hypotheses for the Reagan 
administration. If we examine first the null hypothesis 
that the intercept coefficients are equal (He,: c*o =(!«,) the
13We use Time Series Processor (TSP) to generate these 
results. Following Judge, et. al. (1988, 551-555) we
estimate the nonlinear system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions by a maximum likelihood technique.
’■‘TSP generates this test statistic.
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calculated chi-square value is larger than the relevant 
critical chi-square value. From this information we reject 
the null hypothesis that the intercepts are equal.
With respect to economic perceptions* we may examine if 
reactions to inflation are similar between whites and 
minorities. The chi-square value indicates that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the two are equal.
There is a large difference in the unemployment 
coefficients between the two groups and in a 
counterintuitive direction. Initially one would think that 
minorities who typically bear the larger burden of 
unemployment would punish increases in it more. This is not 
borne out by our evidence. The calculated chi-square value 
for the null hypothesis that unemployment perceptions are 
equal is far larger than the critical value. Thus* whites 
and blacks responded to unemployment in the Reagan years 
quite differently, though we did not anticipate a priori 
that whites would punish unemployment more severely than 
minorities.
The Wald test may also be applied to the nonlinear 
restriction that the slopes of the two indifference curves 
are equal. We test the restriction (from equations 5.1 and 
5.2> that cxia/oti = (alternatively, that otrfte - =
0). The chi-square value presented in the final row of the 
table is significant with a level of signficance a = .05 and
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one degree of freedom, thus indicating that the slopes of 
the two indifference curves are markedly different.
From this analysis of behavior among whites and 
minorities in the Reagan administration we may conclude that 
approval ratings by both groups were significantly affected 
by economic factors. While perceptions toward inflation are 
equal, it is somewhat surprising that whites punished 
unemployment far more than did minorities. Finally, since
the adjusted Rs for the white regression is twice as large 
as that for minorities, we assert that economic factors 
accounted for a larger portion of error variance for whites 
than for minorities for the Reagan administration.
5.5.E Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration
Equations 5.1 and 5.E are modified for the Nixon-Ford 
administration to include a Watergate variable in both and 
are estimated for 1970:2-1976:6, excluding the first year of 
the term due to a lack of data. The results of this 
estimation are presented in Table 5.6.
The inflation coefficient is statistically significant 
for whites, though not for minorities and the unemployment 
coefficient is not statistically significant for either 
group. The Watergate scandal had a large negative impact on 
popularity for both groups. The Durbin h-statistic
indicates no presence of serially correlated errors.
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Did whites and minorities react in an equal manner to 
economic -fluctuations during the Nixon-Ford regime? Column 
£ o-f Table 5.5 presents the calculated chi-square values for 
several null hypotheses. The chi-square tests indicate that 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that perceptions toward 
inflation and perceptions toward unemployment are equal for 
both groups. The hypothesis that economic perceptions are 
jointly equal is rejected, however. Given the
insignificance of the macroeconomic variables for 
minorities, these results should be seen as tenuous.
5.5.3 Summary
Our endeavor to explain presidential approval ratings 
by minorities and whites is most successful for the Reagan 
administration. The presence of many insignificant 
variables for the Nixon-Ford regime do not allow us to reach 
any definitive conclusions. For the Reagan term, however, 
we find that both groups’ approval ratings are significantly 
influenced by both macroeconomic variables.
5.6 Disaggregation by Sex
5.6.1 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
The results of the estimation of equations 5.1 and 5.E 
for the first Reagan term (19S1:E-190^:IE) by sex are 
presented in Table 5.7. All coefficients in both equations 
are statistically significant and the Durbin h-statistics
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indicate no presence of serial correlation in the errors. A 
somewhat larger portion of the error variance is accounted 
for by the economic variables for men than for women, 
indicating that forces not accounted for in the model played 
a larger role in determining approval ratings by women.
Did a "gender gap" exist for the Reagan administration 
as was perceived by many in the media? The series of chi- 
square tests for equality of coefficients across groups 
presented in Table 5.8 shed some light on the subject. 
Reagan did appear to be better received by men than by women 
as the intercept term far men is significantly larger than 
the intercept in the popularity equation for women. The 
chi-square values from the null hyptheses that inflationary 
perceptions are equal, that unemployment perceptions are 
equal, and that the two are jointly equal indicate that 
there are no perceptible differences in responses to 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Therefore, we may conclude that 
while men gave Reagan significantly higher approval ratings 
thus supporting the "gender gap" hypothesis, it was not due 
to his economic performance.
5.6.2 Estimation for the Nixon-Ford Administration
Estimation results of the popularity functions of men 
and women for the Nixon-Ford administration are presented in 
Table 5.9. The basic equations (5.1 and 5.2) are modified 
to include a Watergate variable. Both macroeconomic
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coefficients are significant and of the anticipated sign for 
women. The coefficients of both inflation and unemployment 
are correctly signed for men and both are statistically 
significant. The Watergate scandal significantly lessened 
popularity for both groups.
Did macroeconomic fluctuations cause equal responses 
among women and men for the Nixon-Ford regime? As we 
examine the results of the chi-square tests in Column 2 of 
Table 5.8* we see results consistent with those found for 
the Reagan regime. First* since we reject the null
hypothesis that intercept terms are equal* we conclude that 
Nixon-Ford was significantly more popular among men than 
women. Second* neither inflationary nor unemployment
perceptions are significantly different between men and 
women. The two groups appear to be equally concerned about 
macroeconomic conditions. The hypothesis that inflation and 
unemployment are jointly equal for men and women is 
rejected* thus indicating that macroeconomic fluctuations in 
general create different responses in women than in men. It 
is also of interest to note that the adjustment coefficients 
for men and women are not significantly different for both 
Republican administrations. Finally* the slope of the 
social indifference curves is not significantly different 
for the two groups.
5.6.3 Summary
17*+
Our estimation of presidential popularity functions 
disaggregated by sex is quite successful for both Republican 
administrations. Both Reagan and Nixon-Ford were 
significantly more popular among men than among women. 
Reactions to economic fluctuations were the same among the 
two groups for both Reagan and Nixon-Ford.
5.7 Disaggregation by Political Party
5.7.1 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
The basic equations (5.1 and 5.2) disaggregated by 
political party are estimated by SUR for the Reagan term 
(1981:2-1984:12). The results are presented in Table 5.10 
with t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients appear 
with the anticipated sign and all are statistically 
significant with the exception of inflation for the 
Democrats and the honeymoon for Republicans. The Durbin h- 
statistics indicate no presence of serially correlated 
errors. The intercept term for the Republican regression 
indicates that in the absence of any inflation or 
unemployment, Reagan's approval rating would be greater than 
100 percent. Zero inflation and unemployment rates were 
never relevant, however, and within the limits of the rates 
which actually occurred approval ratings predicted by our 
model are very high but do not exceed 100 percent.
As we compare the coefficients for the three political 
party groupings, we see large differences in the intercept
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terms. Not surprisingly) Reagan was far more popular among 
Republicans than any other group and far less popular among 
Democrats. The series of pair-wise chi-square tests
presented in Table 5.11 indicate that these differences are 
statistically significant.
With respect to economic perceptions) the chi-square 
tests indicate that Independents punished unemployment more 
than did Democrats) but the Republicans responded in a 
similar manner to the other two groups.
The three partisan groups responded to changes in 
inflation in like manner. Though a priori we would expect 
Democrats to punish increases in unemployment more harshly 
than Republicans* it is somewhat surprising that our results 
indicate the two groups punished increases in unemployment 
equally.
5.7.2 Estimates for the Carter Administration
We initially hoped that our partisan analysis would 
yield some insight into the reasons why economic performance 
didn*t effect approval ratings for Democratic presidents. 
For this reason) we present the results for the Carter 
<1977i3-19S0:12) regime in Table 5.12. The results for both 
Democrats and Independents are in line with those we have 
found in other estimations of the Carter administration: 
both macroeconomic variables are statistically insignificant
1 7 6
and the adjusted RE is high despite these problems due to 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.1®
In light of these problems typically experienced with 
the Carter administration* the regression results for the 
Republicans are quite good. Though the inflation
coefficient is insignificant, the unemployment coefficient 
indicates a significantly negative response to increases in 
unemployment. In addition, the Durbin h-statistic indicates 
no presence of serial correlation.16 Unfortunately, this 
analysis does not appear to yield any new information on the 
puzzle of insignificant macroeconomic coefficients in 
Democratic popularity functions.
5.7.3 Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration
Regression coefficient estimates for the Nixon-Ford 
regime disaggregated by political party are presented in 
Tahle 5.13 with t-statistics in parentheses. All 
coefficients are of the anticipated sign and all are 
statistically significant for both the Republican and the 
Democratic equations though the unemployment coefficient is
1=Both the aggregated results presented in Chapters 2 
and 3 and the disaggregated results not reported indicate 
problems with serially correlated errors and insignificant 
macroeconomic coefficients.
16,Since the models for Independents and Democrats 
include serially correlated errors and insignificant 
macroeconomic variables, tests for differences between 
groups are not conducted for the Carter administration.
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only marginally significant for Independents. The Watergate
affair significantly lessened popularity for each group. 3
Once norej we explore the differences in coefficient 
values across parties. The chi-square values for testing 
the equality of coefficients for the Nixon-Ford 
administration are found in Table S.l^v. First) the pair­
wise null hypothesis that intercept terms across the parties 
are equal is rejected) indicating that Republicans rated 
Nixon-Ford significantly higher than did the other parties 
and Democrats rated him significantly lower than did the 
other parties, consistent with patterns found in the Reagan 
term.
It is often felt that Republicans are more concerned 
with inflation than are Democrats. This is borne out by our 
results for the Nixon-Ford administration. The chi-square 
tests indicate that Republicans punished inflation 
significantly more than did Democrats. The difference 
between the Independent inflation coefficient and that for 
Democrats is significant as well, though there is no
1‘7The Durbin h-statistic for Independents is greater 
than its critical value, indicating the possibility of 
autocorrelated errors. We found the appropriate value of 
rho to be very low, -0.0S2. Following Fomby, Hill, and 
Johnson <1984, E14), since this value is less than 0.3 in 
absolute terms there is little to be gained from correcting 
the correlated errors. In addition, the Durbin m-statistic 
of -1.875 is insignificant. Following Kmenta <1985, 333), 
we place more weight upon this statistic than upon the h- 
test. Thus, we continue our analysis with the results as 
presented in Table 5.13.
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significant difference in responses to inflation by
Republicans and Independents.
When examining responses to unemployment, Republicans 
punished the administration significantly more for this 
macroeconomic condition than did the other two groups. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that Democratic and 
Independent responses to unemployment are equal. These
results are to be taken with some reservation, however, 
since the Independent unemployment coefficient is only 
marginally significant.
The adjustment processes of the three groups do not 
significantly differ. There is no difference in the 
response to Watergate by the three parties. This result is 
in contrast to the earlier conclusion of Hibbs <198£> that 
Democrats were more harsh than Republicans in response to 
Watergate.
5 . 7 . Conclusions
We have examined presidential approval ratings by 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents for the Reagan, 
Carter, and Nixon-Ford administrations. We have been far
more successful in our estimation of the Republican 
administrations than of the Democratic administrations. We 
had initially hoped that this disaggregation by political 
party would help resolve this dilemma. Unfortunately, no 
complete explanation has emerged.
179
5.8 Disaggregation by Geographical Region
5.8.1 Estimates for the Reagan Administration
The results of estimation by SUR of Reagan’s popularity 
among those in the East, Midwest, South, and West are 
presented in Table 5.15. All coefficients are statistically 
significant and have the anticipated sign. In addition, the 
h-statistic indicates no presence of serially correlated 
errors for East, West, and Midwest. Since the South’s h- 
statistic is larger than the critical value, we correct the 
equation for serial correlation. The resulting value of rho 
is 0.161. Since this is less than 0.3, Fomby, Hill, and 
Johnson (1984, 241) indicate that there is little to gain by 
correcting the correlated errors. Thus, our remaining tests 
are conducted on the model as presented in Table 5.15. 1(3
Making comparisons among regions becomes quite 
cumbersome as there are so many groups for which pairwise 
tests must be made. Table 5.16 attempts to make an orderly 
presentation of the chi-square results of tests for equality 
of coefficients across geographical regions. The cell in 
the first row, first column of the grid presents results of 
pairwise tests between East and West; the cell in the first 
row, second column compares East and Midwest and so forth.
1QThe Durbin m-statistic for the South equation is 
0.293, less than the critical value. As note 12 indicates, 
Kmenta <1986, 333) indicates that the m-test is preferred to 
the h-test. This is another reason for not correcting for 
serial correlation.
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Within each cell the first figure is the test statistic for 
the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal. The 
second number is the test statistic for the null hypothesis 
that intercepts are equal. The null hypothesis for these 
and the remaining statistics is given in the far right hand 
column of the table.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this analysis is 
found in Column 3 of Table 5.16. With the exception of the 
adjustment process and the slope of the indifference curve, 
all the coefficients far the South are significantly 
different from those for all other regions. Thus, when 
examining the magnitudes of the coefficients for the various 
regions in Table 5.15, Reagan appears to have been 
significantly more popular in the South than in other 
regions as evidenced by the larger intercept term. This may 
not be too surprising given the emergence of both religious 
and political conservatism as a political force in the 
region in the past decade.
What is more surprising, however, is that the 
coefficients of both inflation and unemployment for the 
South are significantly larger than the corresponding 
responses in all other regions. The South appears to have 
punished (rewarded) Reagan significantly mare for 
macroeconomic malaise (prosperity) than did other regions. 
From this analysis, we may assert that Southerners were more
lai
apt to be concerned with the economic realities of Reagan’s
policies than were their counterparts in other regions.
While the coefficient values for the South are 
significantly different from all other regions* the slope of 
the South’s social indifference curve is equal to that of 
both the West and the Midwest. This indicates that while 
the coefficients may be different, the ratio of the 
coefficients of inflation to unemployment are not. Only 
when comparing East to South are the slopes significantly 
d if ferent.
5.B.E Estimates for the Nixon-Ford Administration
Estimation results for the regional analysis of the 
Nixon-Ford administration are found in Table 5.17. Both 
macroeconomic coefficients are statistically significant for 
the East, Midwest and South. The inflation coefficient in 
the Midwest equation is only marginally significant, though 
it is of the expected sign. The Watergate scandal had a 
significantly negative impact popularity in each region. 
The Durbin h-statistics indicate the presence of serially 
correlated errors for all equations but the Midwest. When 
we corrected the equations for autocorrelation, we obtained 
rho values of 0.212, -0.105, and 0.160 for the East, South, 
and West, respectively. As we have done previously when the 
rho values are less than 0.30 in absolute value, we proceed 
with the values presented in Table 5.17 since little gain in
182
efficiency may be gained from applying an autocorrelation 
correction.
The estimated coefficients for inflation, unemployment, 
and the intercept are larger in absolute terms for the South 
than for any other region as they were for the Reagan 
administration. Are they significantly larger? Table 5.IB 
provides the chi-square values for tests of equality of 
coefficients across regions in pairwise tests. From the 
third column we note first that the southern intercept 
coefficient is significantly larger than all other intercept 
terms, indicating that Nixon-Ford was more well received in 
the South than in other regions. With respect to inflation, 
while the South’s coefficient is larger, this difference is 
significant only by comparison with the West. The southern 
unemployment coefficient is significantly larger than that 
for the Midwest though not for the East and West. In sum, 
economic perceptions are largely equivalent for the South 
and East. Our results for South and West and for the South 
and Midwest are somewhat more mixed. It is also of interest 
to note that all regions punished Nixon for his role in 
Watergate equally.
5.8.3 Summary
Our disaggregation by region yields meaningful results 
for the Reagan and Nixon-Ford administrations. We have 
found that for the Reagan term, Southerners reacted in a
1B3
manner significantly different from every other region. 
Their approval of Reagan was significantly higher than that 
for other regions, though they punished macroeconomic 
problems significantly more severely than did survey 
participants in the other resians. Though Southerners rated 
Nixon-Ford significantly higher than those in all other 
regions, the reactions to macroeconomic fluctuations were 
not significantly more severe across all regions as was the 
case for Reagan.
5.9 Chapter Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined presidential popularity 
ratings granted by several disaggregated portions of 
society. We employ Gallup Poll data measuring responses by 
minorities and whites, men and women, different political 
parties, and different geographical regions.
□ur model tends to explain Reagan’s popularity quite 
well. The inflation coefficient is significant in all 
regressions except that for Democrats and the coefficient 
for unemployment is significantly negative for all 
disaggregated groups. With respect to the Nixon-Ford term, 
the inflation coefficient is significant for all regressions 
but those for minorities and the West. The unemployment 
coefficient for Nixon-Ford is significant in those 
regressions for Republicans and Democrats, all regions, and 
for women and men.
1B4
Borne of the more interesting results of our
disaggregated analysis may be summarized as follows:
(1) Though minorities gave Reagan significantly lower 
popularity ratings than did whites, they punished inflation 
and unemployment less than did whites. Since several of the 
macroeconomic coefficients are insignificant for Nixon-Ford, 
similar conclusions cannot be drawn for this regime.
(2) Our analysis of approval ratings by men and women 
for Reagan indicates that men gave him significantly higher 
approval ratings than did women. This confirms the popular 
notion that Reagan experienced a "gender gap." This gender 
gap did not manifest itself in economic perceptions, 
however, as our analysis indicates that women and men 
responded in like manner to inflation and unemployment. 
These findings held true for the Nixon-Ford administration 
as wel1.
(3) When we began our analysis of approval ratings by 
political parties we had hopes of finding an explanation of 
why macroeconomic variables significantly impacted approval 
of Republican administrations but seemed to have no effect 
on the approval rating of Democratic presidents. 
Unfortunately, our analysis has yielded no such insights.
Both Reagan and Nixon-Ford were significantly more 
popular amongst their own party members. For the Reagan 
administration, Independents punished both macroeconomic 
variables significantly more than did the members of the
IBS
other two parties. It is a bit unusual that Republicans
took a more negative view toward unemployment than did
Democrats.
(4) With respect to geographical regions, we found 
that the South, East, and West responded to the national 
rather than the regional unemployment rate but that this 
pattern was reversed for the Midwest. The South rated both 
Reagan and Nixon-Ford higher than did other regions. 
Southerners also had significantly larger negative responses 
to inflation and unemployment as compared to all other 














of Appropriate Unemployment Rate by Races 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Nixon-Ford Reagan
Minorities Whites Minorities Whites
29.09 63.87 25.41 77.51
(9.26) (22.92) (7.96) (25.83)
-0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07
(-1.29) (-3.32) (-2.84) (-3.23)
0.05 -1.39 0.03 -0.03









0.68 0.45 1.03 0.72
(7.18) (5.73) (7.80) (8.03)
0.77 0.84 0.40 0.90
Durbin h—stat. -0.349 0.698 0.497 0.881
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Table 5.2
Tests of Appropriate Unemployment Rate by Sexes 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Ni xon-Ford 
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East LF 0.01 
(0.29)
Midwest LF -0.1A 
(-A.A6)




















Adjusted R® 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.76
Durbin h-statistic 0.701 -0.025 2. 108 -0.AA8
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Table 5.4
Disaggregation by Race for the Reagan Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
klhi tes Minor i t ies
®o » Go —Intercept 79.77 26.31
(35.10) ( 11.45)
®i j Gi — Inflation -0.08 -0.07
(-3.6B) (-3.15)
<*E J Gs* “ Unemployment -0.30 -0.10
(-12.23) (-4.07)
®3 > Gk» “ Honeymoon 1 .15 1.11
(5.63) (3.55)
<?w > £m ~ Ad justment 0.72 1 .02
(7.93) (7.85)
Ad justed R® 0.91 0.42
Durbin h--statistic 0.361 0.940
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Table 5.5
Chi-Square Tests of Minority & White Responses 
(Degrees of Freedom in Parentheses)
Chi-Square Value
Null Hypothesis Reagan Nixon-Ford
All Coefficients Equal 5963.254* 460.550
(5) (5)
Intercepts Equal 484.706* 101,470*
C 1) ( 1 )
Inflation Terms Equal 0.426 2.743
Cl) < 1 )
Unemp. Terms Equal 56.990* 3.174
( 1 ) ( 1 )
Inf. & Unemp. Terms Equal 57.711* 14.010*
(2) (2)




Slope of Indifference 4.039* 0.706
Curve Equal Cl) <1>
♦Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected with the 




Disaggregation by Race Tor the Nixan-Ford Administration 
<t-statistics in parentheses)
Whites Minor i t ies
«o * flo - Intercept 63.47 27.94
(22.04) (10.06)
«i » fit - Inflation -0.10 -0.04
(-3.37) (-1.37)
os, - Unemployment -0. 13 0.03
(-1.80) (0.40)
«3 , (la - Watergate -10.04 -9.52
<-4.30) (-3.61)









Disaggregation by Sex for the Reagan Administration
(t-statisties in parentheses)
Women Men
<x0 » <3o _ Intercept 70.17 79.20
(25.27) ( 30.81 )
®i j (1* - Inflation -0.08 -0.10
<-3.25) (-3.89)
«;=. , — Unemployment -0.30 -0.29
<-9■74) (-10.47)
j fczs ~ Honeymoon 1 . 10 1 .04
(3.73) (5.35)
£~r * (?m„n - Adjustment 0.85 0.61
(6.97) (6.54)
Adjusted Rs 0.80 0.90
Durbin h-statistic -1.405 0.356
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Table 5.8
Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Women & Men 































Watergate Equal 0.453 
( 1 >






*Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected with the 
number of degrees of freedom in parentheses and significance 
level of <x = .05.
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Tab le 5.9
Disaggregation by Sex for the Nixon-Ford Administration
<t-statistics in parentheses)
Women Men
cxo» (So - Intercept 59.01 65.03
(27.43) (26.17)
o(x , - Inflation -0.07 -0.12
(-2.86) (-4.03)
ota, <Se -  Unemployment -0.14 -0.1B
(-2.62) (-2.85)
0(3 » (33  ~ Honey 0.41 0.34
(2.07) (1.72)
ou., (S*. - Watergate -12.51 -11.06
(-5.64) (-4.77)










Disaggregation by Partisan Party for the Reagan
Administration 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Democrats Repub 1icans Independents
Intercept 41.11 104.82 77.32
(10.14) (50.17) (34.91)
Inflat ion -0.06 -0.07 -0. 10
(-1.43) (-3.49) (-4.68)
Unemployment -0. 17 -0.25 -0.30
(-3.B3) (-10.89) (-12.22)
Honeymoon 1 . 16 0.25 1 .35
<4.12) (1 .04) (5.35)
Ad justment 0.52 0.95 0.88
(5.01) (8.58) (7.98)
Adjusted RK 0.85 0.73 -0CD■o
Durbin h-statistic 0.215 0.035 0.717
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Table 5.11
Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Partisan Parties 
Reagan Administration 
(Degrees of Freedom in Parentheses)
Democrats v. Democrats v. Republicans v, 
Reoub1icans Independents Independents
All Coefficients A415.760* 927.900* A050.005*
Equal (5) (5) (5)
Intercepts Equal 226.270* 90.276* 135.022*
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Inflation Equal 0.050 1.099 2.011
( 1 ) (1) ( 1 )
Unemployment Equal 3.A93 9.110* 3.1A6
(1 ) (1) (1)
Inflation & 3.501 9.A17* 4.3AB
Unemp. Equal (2) <2> <2)
Adjustments Equal 8.750* 6.738* 0.233
( 1 ) < 1 ) ( 1 )
Indifference Curve 0.106 0.001 0.6A2
Slopes Equal (1) (1) <1>
♦Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected with degrees 
of freedom in parentheses and significance level of a — .05.
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Table 5.IS
Disaggregation by Partisan Party for the Carter Administration
<t-statistics in parentheses)
Democrats ReDub1i cans Independents
Intercept 49.52 47.22 59.28
(£>.25) (6.60) (7.02)
Inflat ion -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
(-1.75) (-0.23) (-1.51)
Unemployment 0.23 -0.53 -0.42
(1.09) (-2.74) (-1.82)
Honeymoon 1 .04 2.11 1 .72
(2.31) (4.25) (3.51)
Ad justment 0.52 0.54 0.49
(6.35) (6.49) (6.47)
Adjusted R13 0.75 0.80 0.82
Durbin h-stati Stic 3.066 1 .421 3.014
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Table 5.13
Disaggregation by Partisan Party for the 
Nixon-Ford Administration
C t-stat ist ics in parentheses)
Democrats Reoub1icans Independents
Intercept 43. A3 91.00 60.89
< 22.86) (47.91) (25.40)
Inflation -0.05 -0. 12 -0. 10
(-2.30) (-6.03) (-3.84)
Unemp1oyment -0.10 -0.23 1 O • )—«•
(-2.08) (-4.83) (-1.86)
Honeymoon 0.87 -0.21 0.43
(4.IB) (-1.08) (1.52)
Watergate -13.79 -11.43 -14.22
(-7.26) (-6.79) (-6.27)
Ad justment 0.63 0.58 0.69
(9.82) (8.05) (9.37)
Adjusted R® 0.88 0.99 0.80
Durbin h-statistic 1.315 0.519 2.053
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Table 5.14
Chi-Square Tests of Responses by Partisan Parties 
Nixon-Ford Administration 
(Degrees of Freedom in Parentheses)
Democrats v. Democrats v. Republicans v. 
Republicans Independents Independents
All Coefficients 3132.416* 520.366* 1221.386*
Equa 1 (6) (6) (6)
Intercepts Equal 557.779* 92.565* 220.704*
( 1 ) < 1 ) ( 1 )
Inflation Equal 12.331* 7.165* 1. 164
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Unemployment Equal 6.570* 0.073 5.315*
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
Inflation & 37.493* 10.722* 11.925*
Unemp. Equal (2) (2 > (2 >
Adjustments Equal 0.407 0.724 1 .872
( 1 > (1) (1 )
Watergate Equal 1 .298 0.053 1 .818
( 1 ) < 1 ) ( 1 )
Indifference Curve 0.031 0.949 0.899
Slopes Equal (1 ) (1 ) ( 1 )
^Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected with degrees 
of freedom in parentheses and significance level of a = .05.
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Table 5.15
Disaggregation by Region for the Reagan Administration
(t-statitics in parentheses)
East Midwest South West


























1 . 16 
(3.97)












Adjusted R*9 0.B2 0.80 0.87 0.77
Durbin h-stat. 0.00 -0.922 1 .791 -0.A1A
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Table 5.16 






65.680* 43.101* 79.163* All Terms
2.429 1 .347 30.480* Intercept
0.909 0. 105 9.102* Inflation
0. 185 0.028 12.641* Unemp.
1 .314 0. 159 18.230* Inf & Un.
0.383 0.687 0.000 Ad justment
1 . 193 0. 136 3. 160 Slopes











12.916* Inf & Un.
0.445 Adjustment
1 .209 Slopes
♦Indicates significant differences at the significance level 
a = .05. The degrees of freedom for the null hypothesis
that all coefficients are equal is 5 that inflation and 
unemployment are equal is 2 and that inflation, 
unemployment, intercepts, adjustments, and slopes are 
individually equal is 1.
£02
Table 5.17
Disaggregation by Region for the Nixon-Ford Administration
<t-statistics in parentheses)

















































Adjusted 0.99 0.88 0.86 0.83
Durbin h-statistic 3.169 0.716 3.346 2.918
ao3
Table 5.IB 






11.575 IS.175 46.280* All Terms
1 .364 1 . 139 5.182* Intercept
1 . 529 0.063 0. 171 Inflat ion
0. 153 1 .740 0.216 Unemp.
B.910 2.941 0.794 Inf &, Un.
a.6i h 0.005 0.419 Watergate
5.481* 1 .539 6.302* Ad justment
0.007 0.395 0.000 Slopes
11.629 60.186* All Terms
0.005 19.650* Intercept
1 .821 4.957* Inflat ion
1 .892 1 .232 Unemp.
2.430 11 .923* Inf & Un.
3.754 1 .561 Watergate
1 .978 0.005 Ad justment
2.282 0.007 3 lopes
48.721* All Terms
29.074* Intercept
1 . 146 Inflat ion
8.905* Unemp.




♦Indicates significant differences at the significance level 
a = .05. The degrees of freedom for the null hypothesis
that all coefficients are equal is 6, that inflation and 
unemployment are equal is S and that inflation* 
unemployment* intercepts* slopes* and adjustments are 
individually equal is 1.
CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusions
This thesis provides an empirical examination of the 
relationship between presidential popularity and 
macroeconomic variables, specifically inflation and 
unemployment. Presidential popularity is measured by the 
percentage who give a positive response to the Gallup Poll
question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Mr. _____
_ is handling the job of President?" Ule utilize monthly 
data from the Eisenhower administration through the Reagan 
regime, January 1953 through December 1988.
From an estimated presidential popularity function it 
is possible to derive a social preference function. This 
function is essentially an indifference curve between 
inflation and unemployment such that each point along the 
curve represents a combination of the macroeconomic 
variables which yields a constant popularity rating. 
Economic theory indicates that the social preference curve 
is concave to the origin.
□ur examination of the existing empirical literature on 
the presidential popularity function brought to light 
several areas for improvement. The following paragraphs 
will in turn summarize (1) several deficiencies in the 
current literature and (S) the manner in which these issues 
have been addressed in this body of work. In doing so we
£0^
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will highlight the novel contributions this work makes to 
the literature.
First, much of the existing literature assumes that the 
public’s perceptions with respect to inflation and 
unemployment have remained constant over time. Along a 
similar vein, most research implicitly assumes that the 
public holds each president equally responsible for economic 
fluctuations despite differences in campaign promises, party 
affiliations, and cooperation from the Congress and the 
Federal Reserve. It is unlikely that these perceptions have 
remained constant over time.
We estimated our presidential popularity function in a 
"sets of equations" framework. By employing this format, we 
were able to conduct a series of F-tests which indicated 
that economic perceptions and the extent to which the public 
holds a president responsible for the economy have indeed 
varied across administrations. Since these perceptions
differ, it is appropriate to estimate the presidential 
popularity function in a manner which allows all 
coefficients to vary rather than restricting intercept 
and/or slope coefficients to be equal across regimes. This 
empirical finding paves the way for future analyses of why 
and how the public’s perceptions change as presidential 
administrations change.
Second, though there is a firm theoretical basis for a 
concave social preference function, with few exceptions the
206
presidential popularity -Function has been estimated in such 
a manner as to yield a linear trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment. Our presidential popularity function is 
estimated as a quadratic, including inflation and 
unemployment in their squared form, so that the resulting 
social preference curve is concave to the origin as
predicted by theory.'
Third, to date we have seen no empirical estimations
for the Reagan administration utilizing Gallup Poll data.
Since the Reagan term is now complete, we examined this- 
regime as well.
When we assessed the estimated presidential popularity 
functions for the regimes, we found that both inflation and 
unemployment were highly significant for the Republican 
administrations, but that neither was significant for the 
Democratic presidencies. Though insignificant economic 
coefficients for Democratic administrations are not without 
precedent in the literature, it is nonetheless surprising 
that economic factors play no role in determining the
popularity of Democratic presidents. We hope that further 
research efforts will yield a more satisfying explanation 
for this result.
The differences between Republican and Democratic 
presidencies caused us to explore the possibility that there 
is a separate popularity function for Democratic regimes and 
for Republican regimes. An additional series of F-tests
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indicated that there are indeed differences in slope and 
intercept coefficients among Republicans and among 
Democrats- A graphical representation of the social
preference curves for Eisenhower, Nixon-Ford, and Reagan 
reveals that the slopes and positions of the popularity 
curves for each regime at a constant approval level are 
indeed quite different. The Eisenhower curve is much 
flatter and typically lies closer to the origin than do the 
curves for Nixon-Ford and Reagan. In light of the popular 
impression that Reagan’s popularity was “teflon” coated, it 
is not surprising that his curve lies farthest from the 
origin.
Fourth, firmly entrenched in the literature is the 
political business cycle hypothesis: an administration will
seek to increase popularity prior to an election by 
exploiting an expectations augmented short-run Phillips 
curve, causing unemployment to decline at the expense of 
higher inflation- As inflationary expectations are revised 
upward, unemployment returns to its natural rate typically 
accompanied by a higher inflation rate and lower popularity 
ratings, hopefully after the election. Though empirical 
researchers have sought to determine the existence of a 
political business cycle, they have not examined the extent 
to which a president can actually experience gains in 
popularity due to political business cycle maneuverings.
eoe
In order to assess the popularity gains possible from 
political business cycle activity, we estimated a short-run 
expectations augmented Phillips curve for each Republican 
administration. We used the estimated values from the 
Phillips curves and popularity functions to ascertain the 
popularity rate at the natural rate of unemployment, at the 
popularity maximizing position (the tangency position 
between the Phillips curve and the popularity function), and 
the increase in popularity for a series of expected 
inflation rates. For Reagan, Nixon-Ford, and Eisenhower 
these gains were extremely small. In our opinion, they were 
so small as to give an informed presidency little incentive 
to induce a political business cycle.
Finally, our analysis turned from aggregate to
disaggregate popularity models. We found that the existing 
body of research which examines popularity ratings by 
members of different races, sexes, geographical regions and 
political parties suffers the same shortcomings as the 
literature on the aggregate popularity function. Thus our 
disaggregate functions are estimated for individual regimes
and include inflation and unemployment in their squared
form.
Using monthly data for the Nixon-Ford and the first 
Reagan administrations, we addressed two basic issues in our 
disaggregate models. First, we examined whether individuals 
are more responsive to a local or group-specific
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unemployment rate or to the national unemployment rate. We 
found that for whites and minorities as well as for men and 
women there is no distinction between the two rates. For 
geographical regions, however, we found that the national 
unemployment rate is significantly superior to the regional 
rate for all regions but the Midwest.
Our second objective in the disaggregated model was to 
test for significant differences in responses between 
groups. We found that minorities and whites do respond 
differently to economic fluctuations. Though minorities 
typically gave the Republican presidents lower ratings, in 
general they did not punish increases in unemployment and 
inflation as severely. There was no significant difference 
in economic responses between men and women for the Reagan 
and for Nixon-Ford administrations, though the male "base" 
approval rating was higher in both cases than was women’s. 
The most striking result in the geographical region model is 
that while the South granted Reagan significantly higher 
ratings, they were most harsh in their responses to 
increasing inflation and unemployment rates. With respect 
to party affiliations, Independents appeared to hold the 
Republican presidents most responsible for economic 
fluctuations.
In sum, this body of work makes several positive 
contributions to the estimation of the presidential 
popularity function. We have established that economic
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perceptions do not remain constant across administrations 
and thus ail coefficients should be allowed to vary for each 
regime. Second? the presidential popularity function was 
estimated in a manner which allows the resultant social 
preference curves to be concave to the origin. Finally? we 
have shown that while it may be possible for a president to 
generate a political business cycle? the rewards from this 
activity in terms of increased popularity are so small as to 
make this option unattractive.
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APPENDIX I
Summary of Empirical Work on 
the Estimation of Presidential Popularity Functions
List of Abbreviations
AJPS - American Journal of Political Science
AP5R - American Political Science Revies
JGP - Journal of Politics
Po1. Meth. — Political Methodology
Pub. Choice - Political Choice
POD - Public Opinion Quarterly
RESTAT - Review of Economics and Statistics
SEJ - Southern Economic Journal
In the tables which followj * indicates statistical 
significance at a = .05.
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